Free, Hateful, and Posted: Rethinking First Amendment Protection of Hate Speech in a Social Media World by Beausoleil, Lauren E.
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 7 Article 6 
10-30-2019 
Free, Hateful, and Posted: Rethinking First Amendment Protection 
of Hate Speech in a Social Media World 
Lauren E. Beausoleil 
Boston College Law School, lauren.beausoleil@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren E. Beausoleil, Free, Hateful, and Posted: Rethinking First Amendment Protection of Hate Speech in 
a Social Media World, 60 B.C.L. Rev. 2100 (2019), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol60/iss7/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
  2101 
FREE, HATEFUL, AND POSTED: 
RETHINKING FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION OF HATE SPEECH IN A 
SOCIAL MEDIA WORLD 
Abstract: Speech is meant to be heard, and social media allows for exaggeration of 
that fact by providing a powerful means of dissemination of speech while also dis-
torting one’s perception of the reach and acceptance of that speech. Engagement in 
online “hate speech” can interact with the unique characteristics of the Internet to 
influence users’ psychological processing in ways that promote violence and rein-
force hateful sentiments. Because hate speech does not squarely fall within any of 
the categories excluded from First Amendment protection, the United States’ stance 
on hate speech is unique in that it protects it. This Note argues that the harms of 
hate speech, when combined with the psychological impacts of social media on us-
ers, require us to accept that existing First Amendment doctrine simply is unable to 
accommodate the new modes of communications afforded by cyberspace and to 
amend the doctrine accordingly. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 27, 2018, Robert Bowers, armed with three handguns and an 
assault rifle, entered a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania synagogue and opened fire, 
murdering eleven individuals.1 His motivation was anti-Semitism, which he had 
expressed on the social media website Gab prior to the killing and reaffirmed 
afterwards, while in custody.2 This massacre was not an isolated incident, but 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Saeed Ahmed & Paul P. Murphy, Here’s What We Know So Far About Robert Bowers, the Pitts-
burgh Synagogue Shooting Suspect, CNN (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/us/
synagogue-attack-suspect-robert-bowers-profile/index.html [https://perma.cc/MY9W-2MMY]; Campbell 
Robertson et al., 11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; Suspect Charged with 29 Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/active-shooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html 
[https://perma.cc/F8E5-CSLH]. 
 2 Ahmed & Murphy, supra note 1; Robertson et al., supra note 1. Prior to the killing, Bowers told a 
SWAT officer that he wanted all Jews dead and that “they (Jews) were committing genocide to his peo-
ple.” Ahmed & Murphy, supra note 1. Two independent reports, one from Columbia University and the 
other from the Anti-Defamation League, came out just before this massacre, with both reporting spikes in 
anti-Semitic activity online. See David Ingram, Attacks on Jewish People Rising on Instagram and Twit-
ter, Researchers Say, NBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/attacks-
jewish-people-rising-instagram-twitter-researchers-say-n925086 [https://perma.cc/6KWL-C8YR] (dis-
cussing these reports). The Anti-Defamation League released its report just one day before the massacre, 
on October 26, 2018, and detailed the recent increase in anti-Semitic harassment online based on “analy-
sis of computational propaganda, the Jewish American community, and the 2018 elections.” CTR. ON 
TECH. & SOC’Y, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA, JEWISH-AMERICANS 
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rather part of a trend of individuals committing horrific crimes after engaging in 
hate speech online.3 For example, in 2015, Dylann Roof joined a bible study at 
the Emanuel African Methodist Church in Charleston, South Carolina—the old-
est black church in the south—only to shoot and kill nine church members.4 Pri-
or to this mass murder, Roof had “self-radicalized,” as demonstrated by a web-
site he created and used to express his white-supremacist views.5 In Wisconsin, 
in 2012, white supremacist Wade Michael Page murdered six individuals in a 
Sikh temple.6 Page’s online postings contained various references to Hitler, 
white supremacy, and even posts insisting that “passive submission [amounts to] 
indirect support to the oppressors” and encouraging people to stand up and 
                                                                                                                           
AND THE 2018 MIDTERMS: THE AMPLIFICATION OF ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT ONLINE 6 (2018), 
https://www.adl.org/media/12028/download [https://perma.cc/VWU2-TW59]. 
 3 See Rachel Hatzipanagos, How Online Hate Turns into Real-Life Violence, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/30/how-online-hate-speech-is-fueling-real-life-
violence/ [https://perma.cc/Y6DG-USKT] (detailing an Anti-Defamation League report that stated that 
white supremacists committed “18 of the 34 murders documented by domestic extremists [in 2017]”). 
Hate speech generally refers to speech made with intention to insult, offend, demean, intimidate, or ex-
press hatred towards a person or group based on a trait, including but not limited to religion, race, nation-
al origin, sexual orientation, or disability, although precise definitions vary. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 
1744, 1764 (2017) (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing)) (recognizing “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, 
or any other similar ground” as hateful, but constitutionally protected speech); Speech, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ] (defining hate speech as 
“[s]peech whose sole purpose is to demean people on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, 
disability, or some other similar ground, esp[ecially] when the communication is likely to provoke vio-
lence”); Rachel Weintraub-Reiter, Hate Speech Over the Internet: A Traditional Constitutional Analysis 
or a New Cyber Constitution?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 149 (1998) (offering various definitions of hate 
speech). This problem is not uniquely American. See, e.g., Kristen Gelineau & Jon Gambrell, New Zea-
land Mosque Shooter Is a White Nationalist Who Hates Immigrants, Documents and Video Reveal, CHI. 
TRIB. (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-mosque-killer-white-supremacy-
20190315-story.html [https://perma.cc/UJ5N-5VDA] (discussing attack in New Zealand). On March 15, 
2019, a 28-year-old Australian man attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, leaving fifty-
one dead and forty-nine injured. Id. The shooter had a social media presence, and posted a seventy-four-
page manifesto filled with hate speech and white supremacist rhetoric prior to the attack. Id. The mani-
festo paid tribute to two other white nationalist attacks. Mass Shootings: Is ‘White Terrorism’ Now the 
Main Threat in the United States?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.scmp.
com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3021403/mass-shootings-white-terrorism-now-main-threat 
[https://perma.cc/5NUR-PJMH]. 
 4 Ray Sanchez & Ed Payne, Charleston Church Shooting: Who Is Dylann Roof?, CNN (Dec. 16, 
2016), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/us/charleston-church-shooting-suspect/index.html [https://
perma.cc/3T7V-SX7P]; Benjy Sarlin, Nine Dead in Charleston Church Massacre, MSNBC (June 17, 
2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/charleston-police-church-shooting [https://perma.cc/SYE7-QRJD]. 
 5 Hatzipanagos, supra note 3. On his website, Roof detailed his white supremacist views in a mani-
festo, criticizing blacks as inferior and criticizing others who do nothing to further white supremacy. 
Frances Robles, Dylann Roof Photos and a Manifesto Are Posted on Website, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/dylann-storm-roof-photos-website-charleston-church-
shooting.html [https://perma.cc/L562-AZKL]. He complained that “[w]e have no skinheads, no real 
KKK, no one doing anything but talking on the internet.” Id. After explaining that “someone has to have 
the bravery to take it to the real world,” Roof concluded that he had “no choice” but to act. Id. 
 6 Hatzipanagos, supra note 3. 
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“spread the truth” about white supremacy.7 Even the pipe bomb mailer, Cesar 
Sayoc Jr., who allegedly sent out fourteen pipe bombs—none of which detonat-
ed—to eminent Democrats, had been posting “hateful and provocative messag-
es” on social media websites.8 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Michael Laris et al., Excessive Drinking Cost Wade Michael Page Military Career, Civilian Job, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/excessive-
drinking-cost-wade-michael-page-military-career-civilian-job/2012/08/07/274ccc7a-e095-11e1-a421-
8bf0f0e5aa11_story.html?utm_term=.f28fd5aa1bcb [https://perma.cc/6RM5-YMWS]. 
 8 Faith Karimi, 5 Days, 14 Potential Bombs and Lots of Questions. Here’s What We Know, CNN 
(Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/26/politics/pipe-bombs-suspicious-packages-what-we-
know/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z35G-FPDG]; Charlene Li, To Head Off Mass Shootings, We Need 
Better Technology—Not Less, CNN (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/21/perspectives/
hate-speech-social-media-technology/index.html [https://perma.cc/QUU6-7WZR]. Sayoc was active on 
both Facebook and Twitter accounts, one of which he used to threaten a political analyst. Donnie 
O’Sullivan, Bomb Suspect Threatened People on Twitter, and Twitter Didn’t Act, CNN (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/26/tech/cesar-sayoc-twitter-response/index.html [https://perma.cc/5MKY-
SDGK]; see also Wesley Lowery et al., In the United States, Right-Wing Violence Is on the Rise, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-the-united-states-right-wing-
violence-is-on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a-deb4-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html?utm_term=.
de2a4cc08774 [https://perma.cc/V5U7-LXA5] (discussing the rise of domestic terror attacks experienced 
in the United States in recent years); Kevin Roose, Cesar Sayoc’s Path on Social Media: From Food 
Photos to Partisan Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/technology/
cesar-sayoc-facebook-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/X2UN-DCWK] (describing Cesar Sayoc’s social 
media activity as reflecting “a fascination with Islamist terrorism, illegal immigration and anti-Clinton 
conspiracy theories”). By the end of the summer of 2019, in events too recent to receive the attention or 
analysis they deserve in this Note, the United States suffered from even more violent attacks carried out 
by individuals who engaged in hate speech online. See Elisha Fieldtadt & Ken Dilanian, White National-
ism-Fueled Violence Is on the Rise, but FBI Is Slow to Call It Domestic Terrorism, NBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/white-nationalism-fueled-violence-rise-fbi-slow-call-it-
domestic-n1039206 [https://perma.cc/B5XM-V6M8] (listing recent incidents). On April 28, 2019, a 
nineteen-year-old man opened fire at a mosque located outside of San Diego, killing one person. Shan-
non Van Sant, Poway Shooting Latest in Series of Attacks on Places of Worship, NPR (April 28, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/28/718043171/poway-shooting-latest-in-series-of-attacks-on-places-of-
worship [https://perma.cc/LMH7-S7M7]. Prior to the attack, the shooter posted a document on an online 
message board, which was “almost identical to the one written by the Christchurch shooter” in New 
Zealand. Fieldtadt & Dilanian, supra; see also Jennifer Medina et al., One Dead in Synagogue Shooting 
Near San Diego; Officials Call It Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/27/us/poway-synagogue-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/NTC2-CADR] (“The document, an 
anti-Semitic screed filled with racist slurs and white nationalist conspiracy theories, echoes the manifesto 
that was posted to 8chan by the gunman in last month’s mosque slayings in Christchurch, New Zea-
land.”). The document was filled with “anti-Semitic language and lauded white supremacy, nam[ing] the 
Christchurch shooter and the man accused of fatally shooting 11 people inside a Pittsburgh synagogue as 
inspirations for the attack.” Fieldtadt & Dilanian, supra. Just a few months later, on July 28, 2019, a 
nineteen-year-old man fired into a crowd at a food festival in Gilroy, California, killing three people 
before killing himself. Id.; Minyvonne Burke, Gilroy Garlic Festival Shooting Being Investigated as 
Domestic Terrorism by FBI, NBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
gilroy-garlic-festival-shooting-being-investigated-domestic-terrorism-fbi-n1039681 [https://perma.cc/
89KV-PSDX]. Prior to the shooting, the man “left a note on Instagram instructing followers to read a 
nineteenth-century white nationalist book.” Fieldtadt & Dilanian, supra. Less than one week after the 
Gilroy shooting, on August 3, 2019, a twenty-one-year-old man shot and killed twenty people at a 
Walmart in El Paso, Texas. Id. Prior to the shooting, the suspect apparently “posted an anti-immigrant 
screed on an anonymous extremist message board, citing the Christchurch, New Zealand, mosque shoot-
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One year before the Pittsburgh massacre, the Supreme Court of the United 
States reaffirmed that hate speech, like speech generally, receives First Amend-
ment protection.9 This protection, however, is not absolute, and if the hate 
speech falls within any of the excepted categories, the constitutional protections 
afforded to First Amendment speech will not apply.10 Courts typically invoke 
three categories to evaluate hate speech: incitement to imminent lawless action, 
fighting words, and true threats.11 Only if the hate speech fits within one of these 
categories will its proscription be proper.12 This broad protection is unique to the 
United States.13 Various European countries, including Germany, ban hate 
speech in some form, with differences among countries reflecting the lack of 
consensus on a universal definition of hate speech.14 Part I of this Note describes 
                                                                                                                           
er who left fifty-one dead in March, as an inspiration.” Id. On August 9, 2019, police arrested a twenty-
three-year-old security guard in his home in Las Vegas, where authorities found “an AR-15 rifle, bolt 
action rifle, bomb-making materials, and a journal in his room with a hand-drawn picture of an attack on 
a Las Vegas bar that he thought was frequented by gay people.” Danika Fears, Las Vegas White Suprem-
acist Conor Climo Arrested After Threatening to Attack Synagogue, LGBTQ Bar: DOJ, DAILY BEAST 
(Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/las-vegas-white-supremacist-conor-climo-arrested-after-
threatening-to-attack-synagogue-lgbtq-bar-doj [https://perma.cc/N4M3-L7Z3] (reporting arrest). The 
man admitted that “he began communicating with members of the neo-Nazi group the Feuerkrieg Divi-
sion . . . at the end of 2017,” further demonstrating this phenomenon. Id. 
 9 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (explaining that the First Amendment protects even speech that of-
fends). 
 10 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (explaining that the state may constitutionally 
regulate certain categories of speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (explain-
ing the rationale for excluding categories of speech from First Amendment protection). 
 11 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (evaluating racially charged 
and threatening statements under the incitement to imminent lawless action standard); Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969) (evaluating a threat to end the U.S. President’s life under the true 
threat framework); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 513 (4th Cir. 2012) (evaluating a statement 
calling someone “an enemy, not just to the white race but of all humanity [ . . . who] must be killed” 
under the true threat doctrine); In re John M., 36 P.3d 772, 776 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (evaluating a juve-
nile’s racial slurs at African American women under the fighting words framework). 
 12 Planned Parenthood of Columbia v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2002), as amended (July 10, 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Speech . . . may not be punished or en-
joined unless it falls into one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech recognized by the Supreme 
Court: true threat, incitement conspiracy to commit criminal acts, fighting words.”) (citations omitted). 
 13 See Robert A. Khan, Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech? A Debate Between Karl Loewenstein 
and Robert Post, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545 (2013) (exploring the sociological and historical reasons 
behind differences in treatment of hate speech laws in the United States and in various European coun-
tries); Mike Gonzalez, Europe’s War on Free Speech, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.
heritage.org/europe/commentary/europes-war-free-speech [https://perma.cc/NNM3-CU3S] (discussing 
the law governing hate speech in the United States and comparing it with that in Poland, France, Germa-
ny, and the United Kingdom); see also ARTICLE 19, RESPONDING TO ‘HATE SPEECH’: COMPARATIVE 
OVERVIEW OF SIX EU COUNTRIES (2018) (providing a comparative overview of six European Union 
countries’ treatment of hate speech). 
 14 Gonzalez, supra note 13; Mark Scott & Janosch Delcker, Free Speech vs. Censorship in Germa-
ny, POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-hate-speech-netzdg-facebook-
youtube-google-twitter-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/2JY9-FSH4]; see EMORE, AN OVERVIEW ON 
HATE CRIME AND HATE SPEECH IN 9 EU COUNTRIES 8 (2017) (“From a legal point of view, most coun-
tries do not maintain a clear definition of either hate speech or hate crime.”); see also Alexander Tsesis, 
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the impact of social media on the manifestation of hate speech, along with the 
general psycho-sociological processes responsible for this impact.15 Part II dis-
cusses the present First Amendment protection of hate speech in the United 
States.16 Part III of this Note explores the various positions taken by participants 
of the debate surrounding the protection of hate speech.17 Finally, Part IV rejects 
the arguments made by those in favor of protecting hate speech and argues for a 
change in the standard applied in evaluating hate speech, calling for reduced pro-
tection of such speech in light of the impact of technological advances on infor-
mation dissemination and reception.18 
I. PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Social media and related online communications may have profound ef-
fects on human psychology and social behavior.19 These effects, and the dangers 
they pose, are even more pronounced when those communications involve hate 
speech.20 Section A of this Part discusses hate speech, both generally and in the 
context of social media.21 Section B of this Part discusses the polarization mech-
anisms of social media and the social and psychological impacts of such polari-
                                                                                                                           
Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 858 (2001) 
(listing countries that have laws proscribing hate speech). Germany recognizes a constitutional right to 
freedom of expression, embodied in Article 5 of Germany’s Basic Law, but this right is subject to a limi-
tation recognizing “the citizen’s right to personal respect.” Id. at 861–62. Germany has passed various 
laws that can be used to penalize persons who use the Internet to share hateful messages about outgroups, 
including one that subjects to imprisonment those who incite people to hate certain subsets of the popula-
tion, advocate violence or “arbitrary measures” against them, or slander them. Id. at 862. German law 
also holds public distribution or supply of “writings that incite to race hatred or describe cruel or other-
wise inhuman acts of violence against humans in a manner which glorifies or minimizes such acts of 
violence or represents the cruel or inhuman aspects of the occurrence in a manner offending human dig-
nity.” Id. (citing Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the “Ausch-
witz”—and Other—“Lies,” 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 322–23 (1986) (quoting STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 
[PENAL CODE] art. 131)). More recently, Germany passed legislation tailored towards hate speech on 
social media, known as NetzDG. Germany Starts Enforcing Hate Speech Law, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42510868 [https://perma.cc/WT58-8DWM]. This law 
requires social media networks to remove “hate speech, fake news and illegal material” within twenty-
four hours after such content appears online. Id. 
 15 See infra notes 19–64 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 65–126 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 127–205 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 206–262 and accompanying text. 
 19 Bernard J. Luskin, Brain, Behavior, and Media, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 29, 2012), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-media-psychology-effect/201203/brain-behavior-and-media 
[https://perma.cc/KJ3V-AX92]. 
 20 See, e.g., Tom Jacobs, How Hate Speech Boosts Bigotry and Intolerance, PAC. STANDARD (Dec. 
4, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-hate-speech-boosts-bigotry-and-intolerance [https://
perma.cc/PM9Z-Z9QL] (discussing results of a study conducted in Poland linking hate speech with de-
sensitization to violence). 
 21 See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. 
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zation on social behavior, as demonstrated by academic research and studies.22 
Finally, Section C evaluates the amplification of dangers relating to these social 
and psychological impacts, as facilitated by social media.23 
A. Online “Hate Speech” 
Although there is no universal definition of hate speech, a standard defini-
tion of hate speech is speech made solely to express hatred toward, insult, of-
fend, demean, or intimidate a person or group on the basis of a trait, such as reli-
gion, race, national origin, sexual orientation, or disability.24 Online hate speech 
has become increasingly prevalent, and its harms have become increasingly 
clear.25 Even social media companies have taken notice of this trend and have 
adjusted their policies accordingly.26 Twitter, for example, released a statement 
explaining that the platform decided to amend its hateful conduct policy to pro-
scribe content that dehumanizes members of a discernable group based on group 
membership, even in the absence of a specifically targeted individual.27 To justi-
fy its decision, Twitter referred readers to scholars who have recognized the link 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 31–48 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 49–64 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (recognizing that “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnici-
ty, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful,” but remains constitutionally 
protected); Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3 (defining hate speech as “[s]peech whose 
sole purpose is to demean people on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or some 
other similar ground, esp[ecially] when the communication is likely to provoke violence”); Weintraub-
Reiter, supra note 3, at 149 (offering various definitions of hate speech). 
 25 See Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of Regula-
tions in the United States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 256–57 (2003) (“The Inter-
net has provided unique resources for expanding hate propaganda.”); Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 3, at 
146 (“Cyberspace has been and continues to be used to perpetuate hate speech.”). Notably, those who 
participate in organized hate groups have used the Internet to spread their views. Weintraub-Reiter, supra 
note 3, at 148. 
 26 See David Goldman, Big Tech Has Made the Social Media Mess. It Has to Fix It., CNN BUS. 
(Oct. 29, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/29/tech/social-media-hate-speech/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/89SG-56YH] (discussing policy changes made by Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter 
following incidents involving promoting hate groups through their platforms). After this Note was sub-
mitted for publication, YouTube again changed its hate speech policies—this time, taking more aggres-
sive actions. See YOUTUBE, Our Ongoing Work to Tackle Hate, YOUTUBE: OFFICIAL BLOG (June 5, 
2019), https://youtube.googleblog.com/2019/06/our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate.html [https://perma.
cc/4V43-T3LX] (discussing current and past changes in policy). The company announced: 
Today, we’re taking another step in our hate speech policy by specifically prohibiting vid-
eos alleging that a group is superior in order to justify discrimination, segregation or ex-
clusion based on qualities like age, gender, race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or vet-
eran status. This would include, for example, videos that promote or glorify Nazi ideolo-
gy, which is inherently discriminatory. 
Id. 
 27 Vijaya Gadde & Del Harvey, Creating New Policies Together, TWITTER: COMPANY (Sept. 28, 
2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Creating-new-policies-together.html 
[https://perma.cc/5PAQ-56XG]. 
2019] Free, Hateful, and Posted: Rethinking First Amendment Protection 2107 
between dehumanizing language and increased violence.28 Reports on the in-
creasing prominence of hate speech online have led other nations, and advocates 
of restrictions on hate speech, to call for action.29 Similarly, statistics on the rise 
of hate crimes committed in the United States in recent years, which show a 
sharp increase of seventeen percent in 2017 alone, have led to concerns about the 
implications of online hate speech.30 
B. The Creation of Echo Chambers 
Social media acts as a polarization medium, both through users’ affirmative 
actions and less-deliberate mechanisms relating to how one engages and inter-
acts on social media.31 Social media provides users with individually tailored 
receipts of information, which users control through their selections of friends, 
followers, accounts followed, and other interactions online.32 Studies suggest 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. (first citing DANGEROUS SPEECH PROJECT, What Is Dangerous Speech?, https://dangerous-
speech.org/the-dangerous-speech-project-preventing-mass-violence/ [https://perma.cc/88ZB-ZM2X] 
(discussing Susan Benesch’s research); then citing Herbert C. Kelman, Violence Without Moral Re-
straint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES 25, 25–61 
(1973)). Susan Benesch was noted for her work recognizing dangerous speech and its role in dehumani-
zation and normalizing violence, while Herbert C. Kelman suggested that such dehumanization may 
reduce the ability for moral judgments to resist and combat unjustifiable violence. See id. (explaining the 
rationale for policy changes). 
 29 See, e.g., Tom Batchelor, Neo-Nazis Benefiting from Dramatic Rise in Racist Websites to Spread 
Hate and Incite Violence, UN Warns, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/neo-nazi-racism-far-right-social-media-hate-speech-twitter-facebook-un-a8613496.html 
[https://perma.cc/5VSP-HM3U] (relaying a United Nations expert’s warning of increases in attacks on 
various minority groups and communities and noting that the United Nations’ special rapporteur for 
racism has reported a 600% increase since 2012 in the number of individuals expressing white-
supremacist views on Twitter); IRISH HUM. RTS. & EQUALITY COMMISSION, Press Release: Human 
Rights and Equality Commission Challenges Rise of Hate Speech Online (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.
ihrec.ie/human-rights-and-equality-commission-challenges-rise-of-hate-speech-online/ [https://perma.
cc/GQ36-MB53] (discussing hate speech’s increasingly prominent presence online and urging for Ireland 
to take on the role of an international leader in fighting the spread of hate speech on the Internet). 
 30 See Brian Levin et al., New Data Shows U.S. Hate Crimes Continued to Rise in 2017, THE CON-
VERSATION (June 26, 2019, 6:41 AM), http://theconversation.com/new-data-shows-us-hate-crimes-
continued-to-rise-in-2017-97989 [https://perma.cc/B3UH-HWXC] (discussing trends in hate crime statis-
tics since 1992); FBI, 2017 Hate Crime Statistics Released (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
stories/2017-hate-crime-statistics-released-111318 [https://perma.cc/EBE8-9XNG] (reporting rises in 
hate crimes statistics). 
 31 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 1, 
128–30 (2018) (discussing the role of social media in contributing to polarization and in influencing 
perception and behavior). 
 32 See, e.g., How Do I Hide a Post That Appears in My News Feed?, FACEBOOK, https://www.
facebook.com/help/268028706671439?helpref=related [https://perma.cc/Y2K4-8NTL] (instructing on 
hiding content from one’s Facebook newsfeed); How to Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER, https://
help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts [https://perma.cc/KA8K-FWYD] 
(instructing on blocking Twitter accounts to reduce interactions); Using Twitter, TWITTER, https://help.
twitter.com/en/using-twitter [https://perma.cc/CZ9S-UY88]; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 123 
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that another subconscious mechanism contributes to polarization on social media 
as well: confirmation bias.33 A study examining the behavior of over seven hun-
dred individuals during a six-week period, in which researchers found that peo-
ple are more likely to click on links with information supporting their own 
views, demonstrates this phenomenon.34 This idea of a confirmation bias—
meaning that individuals are more likely to visit websites depicting material con-
firming, rather than undermining, their own beliefs—has also been studied and 
confirmed in the context of Facebook and other social media outlets.35 These 
studies demonstrate “the echo chamber effect” of social media, which acts to 
limit the range of information that social media users absorb.36 
In addition to muting an opposite ideological viewpoint, the creation of 
echo chambers can also amplify a user’s own viewpoint through social rein-
forcement, which was first recognized by researchers studying the effect of 
praise on children.37 In 1968, an experiment involving children who had spent 
                                                                                                                           
(discussing Facebook’s algorithm for controlling information feeds and the fact that any information one 
encounters online is not random). 
 33 See R. Kelly Garrett, Echo Chambers Online?: Politically Motivated Selective Exposure Among 
Internet News Users, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 265, 279 (2009) (discussing the tendency of 
individuals to seek information that supports their own); Alexandra Andorfer, Note, Spreading Like 
Wildfire: Solutions for Abating the Fake News Problem on Social Media Via Technology Controls and 
Government Regulation, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1409, 1417 (2018) (describing confirmation bias and its role 
in promoting the spread of fake news). 
 34 Garrett, supra note 33, at 269–70, 279 (explaining the study, methodology, and results). 
 35 SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 118–21, 123 (discussing studies evidencing the effect of confirmation 
bias on Facebook and homophily on Twitter); Victoria Ward, Facebook Makes Us More Narrow Mind-
ed, Study Finds, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/
12086281/Facebook-makes-us-more-narrow-minded-study-finds.html [https://perma.cc/VG74-G885]; 
see also Aaron Retica, Homophily, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 10, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/
12/10/magazine/10Section2a.t-4.html [https://perma.cc/5XVN-LKWK] (discussing sociologists’ use of 
the term “homophily” to “explain our inexorable tendency to link up with one another in ways that con-
firm rather than test our core beliefs”). For example, Itai Himelboim and his co-authors studied homophi-
ly on Twitter, finding that “users are unlikely to be exposed to cross-ideological content” from the users 
they followed. SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 118–19 (citing Itai Himelboim et al., Valence-Based Ho-
mophily on Twitter: Network Analysis of Emotions and Political Talk in the 2012 Presidential Election, 
18 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1382 (2014)). M.D. Conover conducted a study investigating political commu-
nication networks on Twitter, focusing on data from the 2010 midterm elections, and found an “extreme-
ly limited connectivity” between conservative and liberal users. SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 119. A 2012 
study focusing on politically engaged Twitter users similarly found that users received disproportionate 
exposure to ideologically similar tweets. Id. at 120. 
 36 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 114 (asserting that there is evidence of the “echo chamber effect” 
and providing an exemplary study demonstrating); Himelboim et al., supra note 35, at 1395 (concluding 
that the findings in a study of homophily on Twitter evidence the formation of “affirmative echo cham-
bers,” where users interact with others who share similar ideologies and expose themselves primarily to 
content of similar tones); Andrew Hutchinson, Politics, Fatigue, and the Social Echo-Chamber Effect, 
SOC. MEDIA TODAY (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/social-networks/politics-
fatigue-and-social-echo-chamber-effect [https://perma.cc/8TH9-6RWV] (discussing the echo chamber 
effect on social media and role in narrowing the scope of information received by users). 
 37 Kendra Cherry, Social Reinforcement and Behavior, VERY WELL MIND (Nov. 3, 2018), https://
www.verywellmind.com/what-is-social-reinforcement-2795881 [https://perma.cc/XR6Y-CDJF] (citing 
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little time studying was conducted to evaluate the effects of teacher attention on 
study behavior.38 The researchers found that when teachers ignored non-study 
behavior and gave the children praise following study behavior, the children’s 
study rates drastically increased, sometimes almost doubling.39 The social rein-
forcement that the children received impacted both the children’s perception of 
studying and actions.40 
Within social media echo chambers, social reinforcement can act to rein-
force specific arguments or viewpoints and may even encourage users to share 
more controversial ideas than they would have had there been a greater anticipa-
tion of other users challenging those ideas.41 Both results relate to humans’ so-
cio-psychological tendency to seek peer approval.42 When individuals express an 
opinion, they are typically sensitive to their peers’ reactions—specifically, 
whether their peers respond with approval or disapproval.43 Disagreement tends 
to decrease one’s attachment to a specific idea, and approval or agreement tends 
to reinforce one’s attachment to that expressed idea.44 This process, which in-
volves less explicit social reinforcement, has been connected to increases in po-
larization of one’s viewpoint.45 Similar to the effect on the children in the 1968 
study, this social reinforcement and polarization can also lead to action.46 
In a recent study focused on a new German far-right political group and, in 
particular, Facebook users engaged in hate speech on the group’s page, research-
ers confirmed that the propagation of radical or extreme perspectives on social 
media contributes to polarization.47 More importantly, however, in addition to 
finding that hate speech and related sentiments are propagated by social media 
networks, the researchers were able to identify a link between momentary 
                                                                                                                           
R. Vance Hall et al., Effects of Teacher Attention on Study Behavior, 1968 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 
1, 1); Jerry Daykin, Could Social Media Be Tearing Us Apart?, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2016), https://
www.theguardian.com/media-network/2016/jun/28/social-media-networks-filter-bubbles [https://perma.
cc/52ZW-2CRM]. 
 38 See Hall et al., supra note 37, at 1 (providing an overview of the study). 
 39 See id. at 1, 6 (explaining results generally and evaluating increase in a student’s mean study rate 
from thirty-seven percent to seventy-one percent). 
 40 See id. at 10–12 (discussing results). 
 41 Daykin, supra note 37. 
 42 See S. Banisch & E. Olbrich, Opinion Polarization by Learning from Social Feedback, J. MATH-
EMATICAL SOC. 1, 2 (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0022250X.2018.
1517761 [https://perma.cc/YN9W-CNAQ] (citing GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELE-
MENTARY FORMS (rev. ed. 1974)) (detailing the influence of peer approval in opinion generation). 
 43 Banisch & Olbrich, supra note 42, at 2. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Hall et al., supra note 37, at 1 (studying the effect of praise on children); Karsten Müller & 
Carlo Schwarz, Fanning Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime 1, 33 (Nov. 30, 2018) (un-
published manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082972 (linking bursts of anti-refugee sentiment to 
increased incidences of violence). 
 47 Müller & Schwarz, supra note 46, at 1, 6. 
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“bursts” of anti-refugee sentiment in social media posts and incidents of violence 
targeted at refugees, thus demonstrating the real-life dangers of online hate 
speech.48 
C. Amplified Echoes and Harms Online 
In the context of social media, the echo chamber effect proves especially 
dangerous.49 Terrorist organizations, recognizing this, have capitalized on the 
inherent power of social media echo chambers in order to create an online influ-
ence that appears larger than it actually is.50 ISIS, for example, has strategically 
used social media to attract and radicalize individuals from all over the globe, 
taking advantage of social media algorithms controlling content-filtering and 
distribution and the echo chamber effect as amplified by social media to do so.51 
ISIS takes advantage of algorithms and ‘bots’ to create an apparent following far 
more prevalent than its actual following.52 This assists the terrorist group in cre-
ating “echo chambers, in which all moderating influences are removed and vio-
lent voices are amplified,” thus causing normalization of extremist views and 
violence, in particular.53 By creating sub-communities and insulating potential 
recruits from moderating voices, ISIS creates a deceptive and distorted reality 
for individuals susceptible to their influence who then become subjected to the 
normalization of extremist views.54 These efforts have not gone unrewarded, as 
the number of Americans charged for crimes relating to the Islamic State has 
steadily increased.55 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 1, 33. 
 49 See Donna Farag, Note, From Tweeter to Terrorist: Combatting Online Propaganda When Jihad 
Goes Viral, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 843, 845, 863 (2017) (discussing ISIS’s successful and strategic use of 
social media echo chambers to radicalize individuals online). 
 50 Id. at 856, 863. 
 51 See id. at 855, 863 (discussing ISIS’s social media tactics and strategies for recruitment and de-
scribing how online echo chambers supplement these efforts). 
 52 Id. at 855–56 (discussing ISIS’s use of social media bots and algorithms to spread its message). 
“Bots” refer to software that can generate social media posts that appear to, but do not, come from a 
human user. Id. at 856. 
 53 Id. at 863 (citing Peter R. Neumann, Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization 
in the United States, 36 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 431, 436 (2013)); see also Jaime M. Freilich, 
Section 230’s Liability Shield in the Age of Online Terrorist Recruitment, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 675, 692–
93 (2018) (discussing “radicalization echo chambers” and the ability of terrorists to utilize them without 
physically entering the United States). 
 54 Farag, supra note 49, at 863 (citing Neumann, supra note 53, at 435–36). For a detailed overview 
of this process, along with a firsthand account of the progression of this distortion of reality by a seven-
teen-year-old who fell victim to ISIS recruitment tactics, see Scott Shane et al., Americans Attracted to 
ISIS Find an ‘Echo Chamber’ on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/09/us/americans-attracted-to-isis-find-an-echo-chamber-on-social-media.html [https://perma.
cc/P348-D7P8]. 
 55 See Farag, supra note 49, at 844 (discussing the rising number of Americans prosecuted for 
charges related to the Islamic State and noting that among these individuals, a commonality was that “all, 
or nearly all, had spent hours on the Internet trumpeting their feelings about the Islamic State”) (quoting 
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Even outside of terrorism, the dangers inherent in social media’s echo 
chambers are clear.56 The term “fake news” has garnered much attention since 
the 2016 presidential election campaign, as Russian forces have been accused of 
influencing the outcome of the election by spreading propaganda and fictitious 
news stories to damage Hillary Clinton’s reputation and promote Donald 
Trump’s campaign.57 Following the election, in 2017, Congress questioned so-
cial media and technology industry giants, including Facebook, Twitter, and 
Google, for failing to stop the spread of such stories, with senators criticizing the 
companies’ “limp response” to combating the problem.58 While dubious news 
stories may seem innocuous enough, the ease of generating and disseminating 
such stories and the relatively high degree of acceptance of news stories read 
online as true makes the phenomenon of fake news particularly powerful.59 
“Fake news” has even led to violence by those acting on it.60 
                                                                                                                           
Adam Goldman et al., The Islamic State’s Suspected Inroads into America, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/isis-suspects/ [https://perma.cc/C52K-8NAR]). As of 
July, 2018, 125 Americans have been charged and, of those, seventy-six have been convicted. Goldman 
et al., supra. Social media has been a commonality among those cases. Farag, supra note 49, at 844; see 
also Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/12/isis_s_online_radical-
ization_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html [https://perma.cc/U2AE-KTJ4] (discussing “rad-
icalization echo chambers” and concluding that “the change in technology, more than the change in the 
nature of foreign threats, has given rise to a historic and unprecedented danger from foreign radicaliza-
tion and recruitment”). 
 56 See Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 310–11 (2018) 
(suggesting the potential inability of a remedy to counter social media’s polarized echo chambers); An-
dorfer, supra note 33, at 1423 (describing harms associated with fake news). 
 57 See How Russian Twitter Bots Put Out Fake News During the 2016 Election, NPR (April 3, 2017, 
4:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-russian-twitter-
bots-pumped-out-fake-news-during-the-2016-election [https://perma.cc/8255-PSP8] (discussing Rus-
sians’ use of bots to influence 2016 election); Tina Nguyen, Did Russian Agents Influence the U.S. Elec-
tion with Fake News?, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/11/fake-
news-russia-donald-trump [perma.cc/9QKM-BECL] (discussing Russians’ use of “fake news” to influ-
ence campaign); Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html 
[https://perma.cc/6WF2-NPTU] (discussing Russians’ use of fake social media accounts to influence 
campaign and spread anti-Clinton messages). 
 58 Andorfer, supra note 33, at 1411; Hamza Shaban et al., Facebook, Google and Twitter Testified 
on Capitol Hill. Here’s What They Said., WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/31/facebook-google-and-twitter-are-set-to-testify-on-capitol-hill-
heres-what-to-expect/ [https://perma.cc/A23S-J2BH]. 
 59 See Andorfer, supra note 33, at 1417 (discussing the ease with which individuals accept fake news 
as true and social media’s facilitation of such acceptance). 
 60 See id. at 1412 (providing an example of a violent response to “fake news”). In 2016, Edgar 
Welch fired an assault rifle into and subsequently searched a Washington, D.C. pizza restaurant for child 
sex-slaves, after reading a false news report that accused the restaurant of harboring them as part of a 
child-abuse ring led by Hillary Clinton. Id. The story was based on correspondence between the chairman 
of Clinton’s campaign and restaurant owners in leaked emails and gained traction after its dissemination 
on social media, with articles and reports using the term #PizzaGate. Emma M. Savino, Comment, Fake 
News: No One Is Liable, and That Is a Problem, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 1101, 1108–09 (2017) (discussing the 
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The echo chamber effect is a driving force for the phenomenon of fake 
news, aiding in its spread, amplifying its impact, and reducing the ability of le-
gitimate news stories to counter and dispel those false stories.61 As these exam-
ples demonstrate, social media has become a powerful and dangerous propeller 
of the echo chamber effect.62 This becomes problematic when equally powerful 
and dangerous forces manifest themselves through social media.63 This is espe-
cially true where those forces receive constitutional protection as speech.64 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S POSITION ON HATE SPEECH 
The First Amendment, incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, promises protection of speech.65 This protection, however, is sub-
ject to various carve outs in the form of categories of speech excepted from its 
protection.66 Of these categories, three—incitement to imminent lawless action, 
true threats, and fighting words—can apply to hate speech.67 Section A of this 
Part discusses First Amendment protection of speech generally.68 Section B of 
this Part discusses those three relevant categories of excepted speech.69 
                                                                                                                           
spread of #PizzaGate story, which began with tying the term “cheese pizza” to “child pornography” and 
later developed into stories involving “Satanism, kill rooms, underground tunnels, and cannibalism in 
other nearby businesses”); Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate: From Rumor, to Hashtag, to Gunfire in D.C., 
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to-hashtag-
to-gunfire-in-dc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html [https://perma.cc/
X964-K85H] (describing the incident). 
 61 See Thai, supra note 56, at 310–11 (discussing the echo chamber effect’s role in social media and 
the European Research Council’s conclusion crediting Facebook as the most significant tool in the spread 
of fake news); Eric Emanuelson, Jr., Comment, Fake Left, Fake Right: Promoting an Informed Public in 
the Era of Alternative Facts, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2018) (explaining how social media “echo 
chambers” intensify the problem of fake news by creating “homogenous news feeds” that reduce a user’s 
ability to recognize misleading content). 
 62 See Freilich, supra note 53, at 692–93 (identifying the dangers of “radicalization echo chambers” 
created by terrorist organizations in recruitment attempts); Emanuelson, supra note 61, at 216–17 (identi-
fying the dangers of “fake news” as intensified by echo chambers); Fisher et al., supra note 60 (discuss-
ing the #PizzaGate story). 
 63 See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 60 (describing a gunman acting on the #PizzaGate story and the 
story’s origin in speech on social media); see also Thai, supra note 56, at 310–11 (discussing the dangers 
and ramifications of fake news online). 
 64 See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 898 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 
(D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that hate speech can receive First Amendment protections). 
 65 Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 66 See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (explaining 
that speech may receive differing degrees of First Amendment protection). These excepted categories 
include fighting words, incitement to imminent lawless action, true threats, obscenity, child pornography, 
defamation, and speech integral to criminal conduct. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC: THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:5 (2012). 
 67 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (discussing exclusion of fighting words, incite-
ment to imminent lawless action, and true threats). 
 68 See infra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 84–126 and accompanying text. 
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A. First Amendment Protection 
The First Amendment protects speech and other expressive conduct from 
government interference, as the government generally may only regulate such 
conduct without favoring or disfavoring a viewpoint—the principle known as 
viewpoint neutrality.70 This protection extends even to speech that expresses ide-
as that most people would find distasteful, offensive, disagreeable, or discom-
forting, and thus extends even to hate speech.71 The United States Supreme 
Court has described this concept—that the government cannot proscribe speech 
simply because it expresses offensive ideas—as a bedrock principle of the First 
Amendment.72 
First Amendment protection, however, is still not absolute, as the govern-
ment can place restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech, so long as 
such restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored, and balance the interests of 
all involved.73 The context, content, and form of the speech can support lesser or 
greater protection.74 Specifically, if these factors indicate that the speech ad-
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (“The First Amendment’s viewpoint neutrality 
principle protects more than the right to identify with a particular side. It protects the right to create and 
present arguments for particular positions in particular ways, as the speaker chooses.”); R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (discussing the First Amendment’s protection against government 
regulation of speech based on the expressive content). Relatedly, content-based regulations, which violate 
the principle of content neutrality, are presumptively invalid. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. 
 71 Black, 538 U.S. at 358; see also Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 
898 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that hate speech can receive First Amendment protec-
tions). 
 72 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 
1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (“Most governments of the world act on this empirical regularity, 
suppressing critical speech. In the United States, however, the strength of the support for this belief is 
irrelevant. Seditious libel is protected speech unless the danger is not only grave but also imminent.”). 
 73 Black, 538 U.S. at 358; Snyder, 580 F.3d at 214. Where a government action or regulation im-
pedes on an individual’s constitutional rights, such as those listed in the First Amendment, it intrudes on 
an individual’s fundamental liberty interests and therefore triggers a strict scrutiny level of judicial re-
view. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. Under strict scrutiny, the highest standard of judicial review, the state can 
prevail only by showing an interest sufficiently compelling to make denying that right reasonable. Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766–67 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). In other words, the govern-
ment must show that the infringement of that constitutional right or liberty interest is justified by a “com-
pelling state interest” that the intrusion is “narrowly tailored to serve.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 
301–02 (1993). 
 74 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453–54. For example, speech made in a public park or area, and thus con-
sistent with traditional forms of public discourse, would receive greater protection than if it were made in 
a less traditional public forum or if legitimate government objectives justified its suppression. See Make 
the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that protection of speech 
is at its peak in a traditional public forum); Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious 
Status of Non-Citizen Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1273 (2016) (discussing 
cases where the legitimate needs and objectives of government institutions require restricting speech). 
This is especially true for political speech, which receives heightened protection. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 
452–53 (discussing the heightened First Amendment protection for political speech due to the public 
nature of the issues); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (declining to resolve a case in a 
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dresses issues of public concern rather than private concern, then it is generally 
afforded greater protection, as such speech is more valuable to the public dis-
course that the First Amendment seeks to promote and protect.75 Speech is con-
sidered to address matters of public concern when it directly relates to any mat-
ter concerning the community, or when it involves a subject of “legitimate news 
interest,” which is defined as a matter of common interest, significance, and 
concern to the public.76 In evaluating whether speech deals with matters of pub-
lic, rather than private, concern, the appropriateness or controversial character of 
the statement is not considered.77 
The character of the speech, however, does play a role in categorizing the 
speech, which can also contribute to the level of First Amendment protection 
afforded.78 The Supreme Court dictated categories of speech that offer so little 
social value that public interest favors depriving them of First Amendment pro-
tection.79 Some categories, such as commercial speech, receive only limited First 
Amendment protection.80 Others are fully excepted from its protection: fighting 
words, incitement to imminent lawless action, true threats, obscenity, child por-
nography, defamation, and speech integral to criminal conduct. 81 The first three 
fully excepted categories—fighting words, incitement to imminent lawless ac-
tion, and true threats—are the focus of this Note, as they have all been invoked 
                                                                                                                           
manner that would chill political speech and emphasizing that the purpose of the First Amendment was 
largely to protect this speech). 
 75 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452. Courts categorize matters that are only of personal interest to the 
speaker as private concerns. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). For example, a complaint by 
an employee insisting that he or she should have received a raise would “likely constitute a matter of only 
private concern and would therefore be unprotected” under the First Amendment. Janus v. AFSCME, 
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–73 (2018). 
 76 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). 
 77 Id. (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987)). 
 78 See Planned Parenthood of Columbia v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1092 (9th 
Cir. 2002), as amended (July 10, 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Speech—especially political speech, 
as this clearly was—may not be punished or enjoined unless it falls into one of the narrow categories of 
unprotected speech recognized by the Supreme Court: true threat, incitement, conspiracy to commit crim-
inal acts, fighting words, etc.”) (citations omitted). 
 79 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382–83 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)); 
see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[F]reedom of speech, though not abso-
lute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear 
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or 
unrest.”). 
 80 Hudson, supra note 66, § 2:5. Commercial speech is “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 561 (1980). This limited protection comes in the form of intermediate scrutiny standards of 
review, with suppression of such speech accepted only if it “directly advances” a “substantial” govern-
ment interest in a manner that is only as extensive as necessary. Id. at 566. 
 81 Hudson, supra note 66, § 2:5. 
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to either combat or protect hate speech.82 Section B of this Part discusses these 
categories in greater detail.83 
B. Categories of Unprotected Speech Applied to Hate Speech 
In evaluating hate speech, courts often consider whether the speech falls in-
to one of three related categories: incitement to imminent lawless action, fighting 
words, and true threats.84 The first, incitement to imminent lawless action, 
emerged as a confluence of two tests the Court had previously applied to deter-
mine whether to afford the speech at issue First Amendment protection.85 The 
latter two—fighting words and true threats—have been subject to relatively in-
consistent application by courts, which have struggled to draw a clear line be-
tween protected speech and unprotected speech that fits within either category.86 
1. Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action 
Much of the First Amendment free-speech doctrine arose out of the gov-
ernment’s attempts to silence dissidents that opposed the country’s involvement 
in World War I.87 One of the cases that arose during this period, Schenck v. Unit-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (evaluating cross-burning under the true threat framework 
after discussing true threats, fighting words, and incitement to imminent lawless action); D.C. v. R.R., 
182 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1200, 1219 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (analyzing students’ hateful posts on a website 
directed towards and threatening another student under the true threat standard). 
 83 See infra notes 84–124 and accompanying text. 
 84 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (evaluating cross-burning under the true threat framework 
after discussing true threats, fighting words, and incitement to imminent lawless action); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (evaluating statements made at Ku Klux Klan rally, including derogatory 
comments about blacks and Jews, under the incitement to imminent lawless action category); Terminiel-
lo, 337 U.S. at 3 (discussing speech containing critical remarks regarding certain political and racial 
groups and evaluating under the fighting words framework). 
 85 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:3. 
 86 Id. §§ 3:10–:12. Federal courts have disagreed as to whether an objective or subjective standard 
should apply to true threats. D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1213; see, e.g., Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 
824, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the circuit previously applied a subjective standard of intent for 
true threats, but now considers both subjective and objective standards); United States v. Kosma, 951 
F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (favoring the objective, reasonable-person intent standard for threats, which 
is independent of the actual intent of speaker, and listing other circuits that have also taken this ap-
proach). Courts have also struggled to clearly ascertain the line between protected speech and fighting 
words. Compare Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding repeatedly telling neigh-
bor “fuck you,” calling neighbor a “fat-son-of-a bitch,” and calling neighbor a coward to constitute 
fighting words), with Cornelious v. Brubaker, No. 01-1254, 2003 WL 21511125, at *2, *6 (D. Minn. 
June 25, 2003) (dismissing the idea that “fuck you” and similar profanities constitute fighting words). 
 87 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:2; see also Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 329 (“The Alien and 
Sedition Acts passed during the administration of John Adams rested on a sincerely held belief that disre-
spect for the government leads to social collapse and revolution—a belief with support in the history of 
many nations.”). During this time, federal prosecutors used legislation such as the Espionage Act of 1917 
and the Sedition Act of 1918 to silence political opposition to the war effort. Hudson, supra note 66, 
§ 1:4; see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (rejecting contention that First Amendment 
protects the speech that the defendants faced charges for under the Espionage Act of 1917). Various 
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ed States, involved the prosecution of two individuals for distributing documents 
criticizing the war effort and encouraging others to “[a]ssert [their] rights” and 
refuse to “submit to intimidation” with respect to the draft.88 Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, writing for the unanimous Supreme Court, emphasized the wartime 
context of the speech, which he found supported lesser protection.89 In finding 
the speech unprotected, Justice Holmes introduced a new test—the “clear and 
present danger” test—which seemed to supplant the “bad tendency” test that 
courts had previously used to evaluate whether speech was criminal and, there-
fore, unprotected.90 
Justice Holmes’ new test asked whether the circumstances of the speech are 
of such a nature as to “create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”91 He further 
explained that the question is one of “proximity and degree” and demonstrated 
this by emphasizing that during times of war, certain speech that effectively hin-
ders Congress’s war effort may not be protected, even though it would have been 
afforded such protections during times of peace.92 Holmes’ test—which now, 
albeit modified by a later test, is accepted as the standard test for incitement 
speech—encompasses the principle that the government can only suppress un-
popular political speech if it creates a clear, present danger to high-priority inter-
ests of the government, such as its interest in security.93 
Following Schenck, the Supreme Court and Justice Holmes drew on 
Holmes’ “clear and convincing danger” test to uphold convictions of Jacob 
Frohwerk and Eugene Debs, both of whom were charged after engaging in polit-
                                                                                                                           
cases arose under these laws, and the Supreme Court reviewed a select few. Hudson, supra note 66, 
§ 1:4; e.g., Abrams, 250 U.S. 616; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 88 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51; Hudson, supra note 66, § 1:4. 
 89 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Hudson, supra note 66, § 1:4. 
 90 Hudson, supra note 66, § 1:4; see Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. Under the prior “bad tendency” test, 
courts held that speech could be “penalized if it had a ‘bad tendency’ upon the public welfare.” David M. 
Rabbant, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 533 (1981); see Warren v. 
United States, 183 F. 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1910) (explaining that the ability of Congress to restrain the 
rights of liberty and freedom of speech, when doing so “in the interest of the general welfare, peace, and 
good order,” is “beyond question” and consistently upheld by courts). This test was unfavorable to free 
speech, affording it little protection. See Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:3 (“This so-called ‘bad tendency’ 
test struck the balance heavily in favor of the government.”). 
 91 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:3. 
 92 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (elaborating on the circumstantial nature of the application of the test 
for clear and present danger). 
 93 Hudson, supra note 66, § 1:4. Although by its terms “clear and present danger” may seem to have 
more of a stringent temporal requirement, the imminence requirement under this standard was not distin-
guishable from the “bad tendency” test previously used, indicating that this test only really added intent 
to the prior “bad tendency” test that allowed proscription of speech based on only vague or obscure proof 
of danger. 1 RODNEY A SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 10:4 (2018) (citing 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 99–100 (1992)). 
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ical speech that criticized the war effort.94 Following these three speech-
restrictive cases—Schenck, Debs v. United States, and Frohwerk v. United 
States—the Holmes Court pivoted, seeking instead to provide further protections 
for speech and a more rigorous construction of the standard for evaluating un-
protected speech.95 The Second World War and the Cold War, however, both 
accompanied an era of greater restriction on speech and lesser protection to po-
litical dissidents.96 A pattern thus emerged, with greater freedom of speech dur-
ing times of peace and greater restrictions on speech during times of war.97 
In 1969, the standard was modified, adding definition to what Holmes re-
ferred to as “clear and convincing danger.”98 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Su-
preme Court introduced an incitement test, under which advocacy is denied con-
stitutional protection where such speech “is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”99 This 
imminence requirement requires the government to show that the lawless action 
the speaker seeks to incite will result in immediate harm.100 This so-called 
“Brandenburg incitement test” was later clarified in 1973, in Hess v. Indiana, 
where the Court applied the test to a protestor at Indiana University who threat-
ened to “take the [] street.”101 The majority conceded that the protestor’s speech, 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:3; see Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206 (rejecting First Amendment argu-
ments and citing Schenck for support) (citing Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47); Debs, 249 U.S. at 215 (explaining 
that claims that Espionage Act of 1917 violated the First Amendment have been disposed of by Schenck) 
(citing Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47). 
 95 Hudson, supra note 66, § 1:4; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505, 511 (1951) (apply-
ing a relatively broad version of clear and present danger test to uphold convictions of Communist party 
members during the Cold War); Debs, 249 U.S. 211 (speech-restrictive application of test); Frohwerk, 
249 U.S. 204 (same); Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 (same). 
 96 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:3. 
 97 Id.; see also Dennis, 341 U.S. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that the constitutionali-
ty of convictions implicating First Amendment concerns “must be determined by principles established 
in cases decided in more tranquil periods” to avoid “the risk of an ad hoc judgment influenced by the 
impregnating atmosphere of the times”); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920) (“There are 
times when those charged with the responsibility of Government, faced with clear and present danger, 
may conclude that suppression of divergent opinion is imperative; [sic] because the emergency does not 
permit reliance upon the lower conquest of error by truth. And in such emergencies the power to suppress 
exists.”). 
 98 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action.”); Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:2 (discussing the development of the Brandenburg test 
for incitement). 
 99 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:2 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 
447). 
 100 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:2. 
 101 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 110 (1973); Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:5 (citing Hess, 414 U.S. 
105); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (“An advocate must be free to 
stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. 
When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech.”). 
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at best, involved advocating illegal conduct at an uncertain future time, but the 
Court could not find sufficient support—based on either extrinsic evidence or 
the words themselves—to justify finding that the speech was intended or likely 
to produce imminent disorder.102 In the absence of a clear, imminent impact, the 
Court declined to deny the speech protection, emphasizing that a mere tendency 
to lead to violence was not enough to satisfy the imminence standard.103 In doing 
so, the Court created imminence and likelihood requirements that distinguish 
this standard from prior ones.104 Thus, modern jurisprudence tends to offer 
greater protection to speakers of inciting speech than prior jurisprudence, ex-
tending protection even to those advocating for lawless conduct or challenging 
authority, so long as such advocacy does not incite immediate lawless action.105 
2. Fighting Words 
Fighting words involve direct, personal insults that are likely to invoke a 
violent response out of the recipient.106 Although similar to incitement speech, 
fighting words generally apply to negative remarks spoken directly to another 
individual, as opposed to remarks directed to a large group of people to incite 
them to engage in lawless activity that might harm one individual.107 The Su-
preme Court first recognized fighting words in 1942, in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, where it upheld a New Hampshire statute as constitutional because it 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Hess, 414 U.S. at 108. The Court also emphasized that the speaker did not direct the speech to-
wards any specific group or individual, which indicates that he was not advocating for action. Id. at 108–
09. 
 103 Id. at 109; Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:5. Under the Brandenburg test, courts analyze intent using 
an objective standard, which requires courts to consider objective facts and how one might reasonably 
interpret the speech in that context. United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 512 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 104 Smolla, supra note 93, § 10:30; see Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 333 (“Cases . . . hold that 
a state may not penalize speech that does not cause immediate injury.”). In applying the Brandenburg 
test, the speech itself and the circumstances surrounding the speech play a key role in distinguishing 
unprotected communications (e.g., communications relating to planning to set off a bomb in a public area 
at a definite time weeks in advance) and communications that fall short of the standard (e.g., communica-
tions that include rhetoric that tends to cause a crowd to lose control or endanger lives, but not specific 
plans of violent acts). Smolla, supra note 93, § 10:30. 
 105 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:5; see United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(finding website posts coordinating civil disobedience as unprotected speech and reasoning that urging 
individuals to participate in such disobedience at a set time “encouraged and compelled an imminent, 
unlawful act that was not only likely to occur, but provided the schedule by which the unlawful act was 
to occur”); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 329 (“Most governments of the world act on this empirical 
regularity, suppressing critical speech. In the United States, however, the strength of the support for this 
belief is irrelevant. Seditious libel is protected speech unless the danger is not only grave but also immi-
nent.”). 
 106 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573; Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:6. 
 107 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:6. 
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applied to “prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the 
peace.”108 
The doctrine developed further in 1971, in Cohen v. California, where the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a man’s jacket, which displayed the 
words “Fuck the Draft,” involved fighting words, thus settling the proposition 
that fighting words must involve face-to-face insults, directly targeted at an indi-
vidual.109 The Supreme Court further explained the doctrine in R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, where the Court emphasized that fighting words are denied First 
Amendment protection not because of their content, but rather because of the 
unwarranted and intolerable manner of expressing this speech.110 Consequently, 
the government tends to take the position that a person charged with using 
fighting words was so charged based on conduct, such as yelling direct threats or 
flailing his or her arms, rather than the content of the speech or threat.111 
3. True Threats 
Like fighting words, true threats are another category of unprotected speech 
that has been the subject of varied interpretations by lower courts.112 The Su-
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573). Shortly after, in 1949, in Terminiello, the Supreme Court 
considered, but ultimately did not apply due to a preempting concern, this doctrine after Arthur Termini-
ello delivered a speech to a crowd of around eight hundred individuals. 337 U.S. at 3. In this speech, 
Terminiello “vigorously, if not viciously, criticized various racial and political groups,” describing their 
activities as detrimental to national welfare. Id. Highlighting the fact that freedom of speech functions to 
invite dispute, the Supreme Court acknowledged that speech “may strike at prejudices and preconcep-
tions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.” Id. at 4. Because Jus-
tice Douglas did not think that the doctrine could apply to criminalize political speech, which the statute 
at issue did, he found further evaluation under the fighting words doctrine inappropriate. Hudson, supra 
note 66, § 3:8; see Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3, 5 (declining to evaluate under the fighting words doctrine 
because a conviction based on the fact that “speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or 
brought about a condition of unrest” cannot stand). Nevertheless, the Court explained, speech remains 
protected unless one can show that it is “likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substan-
tive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.” Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. 
 109 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:8 (citing Cohen, 403 
U.S. at 25). 
 110 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393. 
 111 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:10. Compare State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 28 (Mont. 2003) (yelling 
“fucking pig” unprovoked to a police officer constituted fighting words), and Gower, 377 F.3d at 670 
(repeatedly calling a neighbor a “fat son of a bitch” and stating “fuck you” found to constitute fighting 
words), with Elbrader v. Blevins, 757 F. Supp. 1174, 1182 (D. Kan. 1991) (calling a police officer a “son 
of a bitch” did not constitute fighting words), and Cornelious, No. 01-1254, 2003 WL 21511125 (yelling 
“fuck you all” to a police officer deemed insufficient to constitute fighting words). For a related view, see 
Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line Requires a Modification 
of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 72–73 
(2002) (explaining that, because some speech does not clearly fit into either the true threat or incitement 
standards, courts have misapplied these standards by interchangeably using them). 
 112 See Hudson, supra note 66, §§ 3:10, 3:12 (discussing lower courts’ applications of the standards 
for true threats and fighting words). 
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preme Court created this category in Watts v. United States, in 1969.113 In Watts, 
the Court rejected claims that an eighteen-year-old’s speech was a true threat, 
instead concluding that the speech was merely “a kind of very crude offensive 
method of stating a political opposition to the President.”114 In finding the 
speech protected, the Court emphasized the statement’s conditional nature and 
the listeners’ reactions, which apparently involved laughing at the statement.115 
The Court did not, however, define a “true threat,” leading lower courts to focus 
instead on the so-called “Watts factors.”116 These factors include whether the 
statement accompanied a political debate; whether the threat was conditional; 
and whether the context of the speech, including listeners’ reactions, is indicative 
of a true threat.117 
After failing to provide a clear definition for true threat in another case, 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court finally provided a definition 
in Virginia v. Black, in 2003.118 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in her plurality 
opinion, explained that true threats describe statements communicating an intent 
to commit some violent, unlawful act on a specified group or individual, regard-
less of whether an actual, subjective intent exists.119 Thus, a definition of true 
threats, which depends upon the fear invoked and not the intent to carry out the 
threat, finally emerged.120 Justice O’Connor further articulated that where the 
speaker directly targets an individual or group with the purpose of instilling fear 
of physical harm or death, the speaker engages in unlawful intimidation that 
amounts to a true threat.121 
Even with this definition, confusion regarding what does and does not cross 
the line from protected speech to true threat remains.122 Courts often apply an 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Id. § 3:12; see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (distinguishing a threat from 
constitutionally protected speech and referencing a “true ‘threat’”). The speech at issue involved the 
young man’s response to a comment made during a discussion on police brutality, in which the com-
menter suggested that the individuals present should seek further education before expressing their views 
on the topic. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. In his response, Watts expressed his desire not to attend an upcom-
ing physical relating to his recent draft and stated: “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want 
to get in my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.” Id. 
 114 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:12 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707). 
 115 Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id.; see United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 
708) (listing these factors). 
 118 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:12; see Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (providing more definition); 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886. 
 119 Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60; Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:12. 
 120 Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60; Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:12. If the speaker only used the threaten-
ing language as political hyperbole or rhetoric this will not satisfy the “true threat” standard. Smolla, 
supra note 93, § 10:22.50 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708). 
 121 Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
 122 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:12; see also Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2028 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s failure to resolve lack of clarity in true threat doctrine); 
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objective standard in evaluating whether speech constitutes a true threat, asking 
“whether a reasonable person would consider the statement a serious expression 
of an intent to inflict harm,” although circuits have diverged in their analyses 
with regards to whether this perspective is one of a “reasonable speaker” or “rea-
sonable listener.”123 In performing this analysis, courts consider the context of 
the threat as well, focusing on various factors, including the reactions of listen-
ers, the nature of the threat (for example, conditional, direct, et cetera), any prior 
incidents where the speaker had threatened the victim, and any potential reasons 
for the recipient of the threat to believe that the speaker had violent propensi-
ties.124 
Thus, while speech that may generally be classified as hate speech is not 
excepted from the First Amendment’s protection, slivers of this speech may be 
denied this protection if they fall within the specific requirements of those al-
ready-established categories: fighting words, true threats, and incitement to im-
minent lawless action.125 The result of this broadly-accepting policy on hate 
speech is an invigorated debate, requiring compromise of equally meritorious 
values, which is further explored in Part III.126 
III. EXPLORING BOTH SIDES OF THE DEBATE 
Critics of hate speech restrictions argue that regulating hate speech violates 
existing First Amendment principles, may lead to abuse through selective en-
forcement, and threatens to undermine the principles that underlie this country’s 
liberal democracy.127 Proponents of regulation disagree, emphasizing the harms 
                                                                                                                           
United States v. Syring, 522 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (D.D.C. 2007) (providing examples to demonstrate this 
split). 
 123 Syring, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 129. In 2015, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the 
intent standard of true threats, but failed to do so. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2028 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Given the majority’s ostensible concern for protecting innocent actors, one would have expected it to 
announce a clear rule—any clear rule. Its failure to do so reveals the fractured foundation upon which 
today’s decision rests.”); see also Stephanie Charlin, Comment, Clicking the “Like” Button for Reckless-
ness: How Elonis v. United States Changed True Threats Analysis, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 705, 707 
(2016) (discussing the growing importance of resolving intent issue in the digital age, where threats can 
more easily and rapidly inflict harm than ever before, and criticizing the Court’s failure to resolve the 
issue in Elonis). 
 124 Syring, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (citing United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 
1996)). 
 125 See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (discussing the exclusion of fighting words, incitement to imminent 
lawless action, and true threats); see, e.g., D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1200, 1225 (analyzing stu-
dents’ hateful posts on a website directed towards and threatening another student under true threat 
standard). 
 126 See infra notes 127–202 and accompanying text. 
 127 See, e.g., Sandra Coliver, Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE 
SPEECH, FREE SPEECH, AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 263, 374 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992) (describing the 
harmful effects of “selective or lax enforcement” in various nations and questioning the effectiveness of 
hate speech regulations in Europe based on increases in racist and xenophobic sentiments in European 
2122 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2101 
advanced by hate speech, referencing the regulations imposed in other democra-
cies, and noting the outdated origins of First Amendment jurisprudence.128 Sec-
tion A of this Part explores the arguments advanced by regulation critics in more 
detail.129 Section B explores those maintained by advocates of hate speech regu-
lation.130 
A. Arguments Against Hate Speech Regulation 
Critics of hate speech regulation typically make policy arguments warning 
against violation of First Amendment principles and practical arguments based 
on trends in countries that regulate such speech, focusing on reports of abuse by 
those charged with enforcing speech restrictions and on the failure of regulations 
to effectively combat hate.131 
1. First Amendment Arguments 
First, critics argue that speech of this nature should be evaluated as incite-
ment to imminent lawless action, which requires a showing of clear and present 
danger that generally cannot be made with hate speech.132 In doing so, critics 
                                                                                                                           
countries); see also Nadine Strossen, Incitement to Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
243, 259 (2001) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ‘Hate Speech’ and Freedom of Expression, A Human 
Rights Watch Policy Paper, Mar. 1992, at 4) (“The conclusion of all these papers was clear: not even any 
correlation, let alone any causal relationship, could be shown between the enforcement of anti-hate 
speech laws by the governments in particular countries and an improvement in equality or inter-group 
relations in those countries.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of 
Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 155 (1992) (explaining that the potential to incite violence and 
harm society generally is a common justification for suppression of hate speech); Tsesis, supra note 14, 
at 861 (“Germany is another democracy committed to free expression which, nevertheless, recognizes the 
social menace posed by hate speech and penalizes it.”); Hammack, supra note 111, at 81 (emphasizing 
that the relevant case law developed prior to the rise of Internet communications and listing the character-
istics that differentiate harmful Internet communications from those made in a more traditional forum). 
 129 See infra notes 131–147 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 148–205 and accompanying text. 
 131 See generally John T. Bennett, The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the Empirical and Legal 
Bases of Hate Speech Regulation, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445 (2016) (arguing against the regulation 
of hate speech by presenting policy arguments and practical arguments based on uncertainties about 
intangible, speech-based harms). 
 132 See Strossen, supra note 127, at 244–45 (“Our position is not that government may never restrict 
speech, but rather, that it may do so only under very limited circumstances. In a nutshell, government 
may suppress speech only if necessary to prevent a clear and present danger of actual or imminent 
harm.”); accord Bennett, supra note 131, at 476, 500 (“Speech regulation requires more than a loose 
connection or imaginary association between speech and social harm. Whether hate speech causes immi-
nent harm is an empirical question with major constitutional ramifications.”); see also Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (standard for incitement speech). Scholars have also considered hate 
speech in the context of fighting words and true threats, but the nature of hate speech makes analysis 
most appropriate under the incitement standard. See Bennett, supra note 131, at 525 (“A theoretical ‘cli-
mate of hate’ will not justify restrictions on speech because hate falls short of harm. In fact, hate falls 
short of being a threat as well.”); William Funk, Intimidation and the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 
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reject arguments involving the harm of hate speech, either as too attenuated from 
the speech itself or insufficiently severe to justify a finding of a clear and present 
danger of imminent harm based on that connection alone.133 Some have even 
challenged the notion that banning hate speech would be beneficial, suggesting 
that shielding individuals from speech that is associated with negative psycho-
logical impacts can actually undermine mental health and may even lead to retal-
iatory violence by the speakers.134 Accordingly, with this showing hindered by 
the apparently weak causal connection between hate speech and social harm, 
critics argue that one cannot properly fit hate speech within a categorical exclu-
sion from the First Amendment.135 
Second, and relatedly, scholars insist that banning hate speech where there 
is no clear and present danger of imminent harm amounts to unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination, as the speech does not fall into an excluded category 
of speech.136 Critics rely on the “marketplace of ideas” theory to defend their 
commitment to the First Amendment and its protection of hate speech, explain-
ing that a free market of ideas is necessary for the truth to prevail.137 Relatedly, 
they insist that a plurality of views must be available for the promotion of de-
mocracy through public discourse, as this allows individuals to access opposing 
                                                                                                                           
579, 580 (2006) (discussing the limitations of existing categories due to the nature of hate speech). As 
Scott Hammack explains, hate speech on the Internet often takes the form of “threat/incitement hybrids” 
that maintain First Amendment protection because they can neither clearly be considered incitement nor 
true threats. Hammack, supra note 111, at 67. These hybrids, he explains, are a result of the unique char-
acteristics of the Internet converging to blur the line between threats and incitements by allowing people 
to threaten through this incitement. Id. In other words, speech on the Internet allows individuals to create 
fear by increasing the risk of ensuing violence, without actually making any explicit threats themselves. 
Id. 
 133 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 131, at 476, 500 (attacking harm-based arguments based on a weak 
causal connection and based on insufficient harms); Strossen, supra note 127, at 250 (attacking harm-
based arguments based on a weak causal connection). 
 134 See, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT 
CENSORSHIP 150–51 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 2018) (warning that eliminating exposure to hate 
speech might harm mental health by reducing beneficial psychological stress and suggesting that gov-
ernment suppression of speech may result in retaliatory violence by speakers); accord Bennett, supra 
note 131, at 500 (“Rather than advancing social justice, calls for regulation may actually entrench the 
status quo, which uplifts no one and is actually debilitating.”). 
 135 Bennett, supra note 131, at 525. 
 136 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 127, at 252 (describing content or viewpoint neutrality as a funda-
mental principle of free speech that suppression of hate speech violates). Thus, critics argue that regula-
tion would violate the principle of viewpoint neutrality, which requires that the state refrain from restrict-
ing public speech based on disagreement with the view expressed, unless the suppression of speech is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See id. (discussing viewpoint neutrality, the appro-
priate standard of scrutiny applied to viewpoint discrimination, and the risks that this principle mitigates); 
accord Bennett, supra note 131, at 505–07 (evaluating hate speech restrictions under the standard applied 
to content-based speech restrictions and concluding that such regulations inevitably will fail to meet the 
narrow tailoring requirement). 
 137 Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech Against “Private Figures”: Lessons in Power-Based 
Censorship from Defamation Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001); see, e.g., Weintraub-
Reiter, supra note 3, at 162 (justifying and explaining the marketplace of ideas theory). 
2124 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2101 
views and determine which one they deem correct.138 Emphasizing the value of 
these opposing views, or “counter-speech,” critics warn about the dangers of 
interfering with these democratic processes by weakening protection or stretch-
ing the doctrine in an attempt to find hate speech unprotected.139 
2. Practicality & Practice Arguments 
Arguments grounded in practice, rather than policy, are also common 
among critics of regulation.140 For example, critics of hate speech regulation 
emphasize potentials for abuse that arise with such regulation.141 Critics warn of 
selective enforcement and “flagrant abuse” by authorities in various countries, 
arguing that hate speech restrictions in these areas have been used to the detri-
ment of minority communities, leading to alienation and compromise of the right 
of dissent.142 Some have drawn on this to urge hate speech restriction advocates 
to focus instead on promoting non-discrimination more generally, reasoning that 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See, e.g., Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 3, at 161–62 (insisting that allowing hate speech promotes 
democracy by providing a plurality of views from which one may assess and utilize to engage in in-
formed democratic decision making). 
 139 See Bennett, supra note 131, at 502 (discussing the dangers of stretching First Amendment doc-
trine too far and insisting that its foundation will progressively weaken as more and more speech loses 
protection) (quoting Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357 (1989)); accord Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 3, at 162 (“[T]he restriction 
of speech on media would ultimately inhibit the growth of a democratic society.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Commentary: Hate Speech Is Infecting America, but Trying to Ban It Is Not the Answer, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 
31, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-hate-speech-censor-
first-amendment-1101-20181031-story.html [https://perma.cc/D2PQ-EZQY] (contending that granting 
governments the power to suppress speech they dislike would be more harmful than hate speech). 
 140 See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 81 (“Given the pervasiveness of individual and institu-
tional bias, the government is likely to enforce ‘hate speech’ laws, as it has other laws, to the disad-
vantage of disempowered and marginalized groups. Indeed, laws censoring ‘hate speech’ have predicta-
bly been enforced against those who lack political power . . . .”); see also Coliver, supra note 127, at 
373–74 (discussing abuse of laws restricting hate speech by authorities in Sri Lanka, South Africa, East-
ern Europe, and the former Soviet Union and selective enforcement in United Kingdom, Israel, and the 
former Soviet Union); Strossen, supra note 127, at 258–59 (discussing findings that indicate the ineffec-
tiveness of hate speech restrictions in combating social inequality, bias, and discrimination). 
 141 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 127, at 258 (“Laws that penalize speech or membership are also 
subject to abuse by the dominant racial or ethnic group. Some of the most stringent ‘hate speech’ laws, 
for example, have long been in force in South Africa, where they have been used almost exclusively 
against the black majority.”) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 127, at 4). Many attribute this 
potential for abuse to the subjective nature of delineating what speech amounts to hate speech, which is 
heightened by the ambiguity in defining hate speech. See STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 72 (explaining 
that the subjective nature of inquiry behind discerning hate speech increases its potential for abuse); Ben-
nett, supra note 131, at 487 (suggesting that relying on psycho-emotional harms to evaluate whether 
speech should be curtailed “would call for a highly subjective inquiry into personal feelings” and noting 
the constitutional concerns it would raise). 
 142 See Coliver, supra note 127, at 373–74 (warning of abuse); Strossen, supra note 127, at 259 
(discussing Coliver’s findings and concerns). Sandra Coliver, for example, points to selective enforce-
ment in the United Kingdom, Israel, and the former Soviet Union, and she notes abuse by authorities in 
Sri Lanka and South America. Coliver, supra note 127, at 374; Strossen, supra note 127, at 259. 
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racism and xenophobia have become increasingly prevalent throughout Europe 
despite the existence of such hate speech laws.143 
Similar arguments against speech restriction emphasize the failure of such 
regulations to combat discrimination and intolerance after implementation.144 
Critics rely on various studies to demonstrate this ineffectiveness, such as the 
findings of international free speech organization Article 19 after hosting a con-
ference in 1991, during which representatives from fifteen countries gathered to 
discuss and evaluate the effectiveness of their respective anti-hate speech laws in 
combating discrimination, bias, and inequality.145 The findings failed to show 
any causal or correlative relationship between enforcement and improvements in 
combatting social inequality and discrimination.146 Critics have also pointed to 
another experience and observation-based study, conducted in 1992, in which 
international human rights organization Human Rights Watch concluded that 
suppressing hate speech is an ineffective means of promoting equality and less-
ening discrimination, a conclusion based on its finding of a weak connection 
between suppression and reduced ethnic or racial tension.147 
B. Hate Speech Regulation Advocates’ Arguments 
While recognizing the First Amendment principles at stake, proponents of 
hate speech regulation insist that a complete compromise of democratic institu-
tions is avoidable and, to the degree that any compromise must be made, it is 
warranted.148 Advocates point to other democracies that have also sought to bal-
ance the right to free speech with the desire to preserve democratic institutions 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Coliver, supra note 127, at 373–74 (questioning the effectiveness of regulations and pointing 
to increases in bias and discrimination despite European hate speech laws); accord STROSSEN, supra note 
134, at 137 (discussing a survey among European Jews, wherein sixty-seven percent reported increases 
in anti-Semitism despite the enactment of hate speech laws). 
 144 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 127, at 258–59 (discussing findings of Article 19 and Human 
Rights Watch). 
 145 See, e.g., id. (relying on this study for support). Article 19 seeks to promote freedom of expres-
sion and strives for a world in which speakers may enjoy this protection in the absence of fear of discrim-
ination. Annual Report, ARTICLE 19, https://www.article19.org/about-us/annual-report/ [https://perma.
cc/5YNW-93XF]. In doing so, its team works on local, national, and international levels to “promote 
media freedom, increase access to information, protect journalists and human rights defenders, fight the 
shrinking of civic space, and place human rights at the heart of developing digital spaces.” Id. 
 146 Strossen, supra note 127, at 259. 
 147 See id. at 258 (discussing the Human Rights Watch’s study and findings). 
 148 See Matsuda, supra note 139, at 2630–31 (“While the value of free speech can guide the choice 
of procedure—including evidentiary rules and burdens of persuasion—it should not completely remove 
recourse to the institution of law to combat racist speech.”); Tsesis, supra note 14, at 869 (“[A]bstract 
uncertainties about potential evils should not constrain legislators from passing laws narrowly designed 
to curb expressions whose only object is to endanger the lives, professions, properties, and civil liberties 
of the less powerful.”); see also Tsesis, supra note 14, at 858 (explaining that other countries have enact-
ed legislation to suppress hate speech in recognition of the threats hate speech poses to democracies, 
human rights, and human dignity). 
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but have nevertheless adopted laws against hate speech, such as Germany and 
Canada.149 In making their own arguments in favor of regulation, advocates fo-
cus on the antiquity of the current First Amendment doctrine—the foundation of 
which lies upon assumptions that they contend translate poorly into the Internet 
age—and on the harms created by both online and offline hate speech.150 
1. Attacks on an Antiquated Doctrine 
Advocates of regulation have criticized existing First Amendment jurispru-
dence as outdated, highlighting the antiquated presumptions built within its 
foundation.151 Much of this criticism is due in large part to the drastic changes 
brought on by the Internet and amplified by social media, both of which possess 
certain characteristics that complicate application of First Amendment jurispru-
dence.152 To demonstrate this complication, advocates of regulation emphasize 
the unique qualities of cyberspace.153 For example, cyberspace allows for both 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See Timofeeva, supra note 25, at 254, 257 (contrasting the United States’ approach with that of 
Germany and explaining that both nations share commitment to freedom of speech and traditional liber-
alism tenets); Tsesis, supra note 14, at 861–62 (discussing Canada, Germany, and other western democ-
racies that have adopted hate speech restrictions); Thomas J. Webb, Note, Verbal Poison—Criminalizing 
Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis and a Proposal for the American System, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 445, 
446 (2011) (contrasting the United States’ position on hate speech with those of “nearly every nation 
across the globe” who have regulated hate speech in favor of promotion of human dignity and protection 
of minorities over freedom of speech). 
 150 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 131, at 475 (explaining the harm argument made by advocates of 
hate speech regulation); Hammack, supra note 111, at 81 (explaining cases behind the development of 
speech that incites imminent lawless action and noting that all of the cases previously discussed “predate 
the Internet’s emergence as a popular mode of communication”). 
 151 See Funk, supra note 132, at 580 (arguing that First Amendment doctrine does not contemplate, 
and thus does not directly address, the type of threatening and inciting speech communicated on the In-
ternet); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 161 
(2011) (discussing the problem with applying Brandenburg standard to social media and highlighting 
differences between audiences and speakers contemplated by the Brandenburg test and those who use 
social media to express views); Hammack, supra note 111, at 66 (explaining that First Amendment juris-
prudence relating to potentially threatening speech arose in the context of communications made in “fun-
damentally different media,” where cases typically involved “remarks relayed to a very limited audience 
through pamphlets or at small rallies” and thus required a simpler analysis). 
 152 See Lidsky, supra note 151, at 161 (criticizing First Amendment doctrine for this reason); Ham-
mack, supra note 111, at 96 (explaining that traditional approaches to true threats fail to effectively com-
bat online threats and noting that the Internet aggravates pre-existing doctrinal shortcomings and prob-
lems); see also Timofeeva, supra note 25, at 254 (“In spite of many new communicative and technical 
options of the Internet, both the United States and Germany attempt to fit this new media into their old 
free speech standards.”). 
 153 See Timofeeva, supra note 25, at 253–54 (describing unique qualities of the Internet, including its 
various communicative options in terms of parties involved and audience number, its lack of inherent 
restrictions on size or resources, and its provision of globalism and anonymity); Thomas E. Crocco, 
Comment, Inciting Terrorism on the Internet: An Application of Brandenburg to Terrorist Websites, 23 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 451, 456 (2004) (“[T]he Court has not yet fully explored the unique character-
istics of a ubiquitous electronic forum, where speakers are unseen and listeners unknown in a non-
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contextual, geographical, and temporal dislocations, as anything posted on the 
Internet can have an international reach and can be viewed long after it is origi-
nally posted.154 Especially with the advent of social media, cyberspace has dras-
tically increased the prospective audience size and the number of individuals 
able to participate in unmediated, unregulated communication.155 Both the audi-
ence and speaker can remain anonymous, and the physical crowd that typically 
comprises an audience is rare.156 Advocates also note that, whereas traditional 
forms of communications forced one to pause and reflect before response, the 
Internet permits much more immediate results that can lead to more violent or 
instinctive reactions.157 
In contrast, much of First Amendment doctrine developed in an age where 
physical space, geographical location, and time limited an audiences’ size and 
composition.158 Advocates highlight consequences stemming from these differ-
ences, arguing, for example, that counter-speech, a common justification for the 
United States’ protection of most speech, is unlikely to exist within the like-
minded communities that form through online communications, making counter-
speech an ineffective deterrent.159 Additionally, the inability to ascertain the pre-
                                                                                                                           
contemporaneous setting.”); Hammack, supra note 111, at 67 (“The unique characteristics of the Internet 
blur the distinction between threats and incitement by allowing speakers to threaten by incitement . . . .”). 
 154 Lidsky, supra note 151, at 148–49; see also Hammack, supra note 111, at 67 (“[T]he Internet 
allows a potentially unlimited and transient audience to communicate across the world with great speed 
and anonymity, and to do so at a fraction of the cost of other modes of communication.”). 
 155 Lidsky, supra note 151, at 149. 
 156 Id.; see also id. (“A social media audience member is truly part of a lonely crowd.”) (quoting 
Janet Morahan-Martin & Phyllis Schumacher, Loneliness and Social Uses of the Internet, 19 COMPUT-
ERS HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2003)). 
 157 See, e.g., Hammack, supra note 111, at 83 (discussing traditional communication’s longer period 
of time for deliberation and self-restraint due to delay between generating a thought and subsequently 
sharing that thought, which the Internet has reduced through its facilitation of low-cost, high-speed com-
munication). As Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky explains, the audience or “crowds” on social media do not main-
tain “the physical connections between crowds in ‘real space’ [that] potentially exert a restraining influ-
ence on the individual who is spurred to violent actions by the words of a fiery speaker.” Lidsky, supra 
note 151, at 149–50. 
 158 Lidsky, supra note 151, at 149. Prior to the advent of the Internet, leading cases on threatening 
speech involved remarks made to limited audiences either through pamphlets or small rallies. Hammack, 
supra note 111, at 66. As Thomas E. Crocco explains, cyberspace has “replaced the soapbox as the ‘poor 
man’s’ forum,” thus replacing the contemporaneous settings contemplated by the doctrine with non-
contemporaneous ones “where speakers are unseen and listeners unknown.” Crocco, supra note 153, at 
456. 
 159 See, e.g., Hammack, supra note 111, at 82 (explaining that “the inability to ensure that the public 
has access to both sides of the debate” on the Internet often makes a productive debate involving counter-
speech impossible). Hammack provides an example to illustrate this concept, explaining that “if an anti-
Semitic web site publishes falsehoods slandering Jews, visitors to that site would be unlikely to visit a 
Jewish organization’s web site refuting the anti-Semitic speech.” Id. He emphasizes the widely scattered 
nature of an online audience and contrasts that with those of more traditional forms of media, such as 
pamphlets, televisions, and publications. See id. at 81–82. 
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cise audience of an Internet communication at any given time hinders the ability 
to fight any speech with counter-speech or rational debate.160 
According to regulation advocates, attempting to fit online hate speech into 
the doctrines designed to combat similarly socially-undesirable, threatening, or 
harm-inciting speech demonstrates First Amendment doctrine’s inability to con-
template those changes.161 For example, because fighting words contemplate 
direct, face-to-face interaction, that doctrine is unable to accommodate direct 
speech that is intended to serve the same purpose, but communicated online, i.e., 
face-to-screen-to-screen-to-face communication.162 The true threat doctrine also 
falls short in the context of Internet hate speech because hate speech takes the 
form of more indirect threats, either implicit through the threats of harm it poses 
to its intended audience or victims, or explicit but directed to a general group of 
people rather than a specific target.163 
Attempts to fit this speech into the incitement to imminent lawless action 
category also fail, a consequence of the imminence requirement.164 The tem-
poral, geographic, and contextual dislocation made possible by cyberspace 
makes any direct, immediate consequence of an Internet communication—
whether harmful or not—almost impossible to ascertain.165 It is difficult to iden-
                                                                                                                           
 160 Id. at 81–82. 
 161 See, e.g., Crocco, supra note 153, at 457 (“Brandenburg provides the basis for making that de-
termination for speech that incites others to unlawful activity, but its modern application has been to 
situations more akin to the real-time characteristics of a soapbox than to the virtual, extra-
contemporaneous character of the Internet.”); Hammack, supra note 111, at 67 (discussing the difficulty 
in applying true threat doctrine to online hate speech and arguing that courts should refine their approach 
to true threats to adapt to the changes brought about by the Internet); see also John P. Cronan, The Next 
Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 425, 456 (2002) (arguing that the “goals of preventing the undesirable consequences of incitement” 
cannot be attained on the Internet without altering the interpretation of the imminence requirement). 
 162 See Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:6 (explaining the direct, face-to-face nature of the type of speech 
that gave rise to the fighting words doctrine); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 402 
(1992) (White, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for legitimizing hate speech as a form of debate by 
imposing a standard for fighting words contingent on conduct and context, rather than content of those 
fighting words alone). Justice White expresses disagreement with Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
fighting words for this exact reason, arguing that “a ban on all fighting words or on a subset of the 
fighting words category would restrict only the social evil of hate speech, without creating the danger of 
driving viewpoints from the marketplace.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401. 
 163 Hammack, supra note 111, at 67. 
 164 Crocco, supra note 153, at 456. For example, a few weeks before the election of President Barack 
Obama, Walter Bagdasarian posted the following statements online: “‘Re: Obama fk the niggar, he will 
have a 50 cal in the head soon’ and . . . ‘shoot the nig.’” United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 
1115 (9th Cir. 2011). Judge Stephen Roy Reinhardt, speaking for the majority, described the statements 
as “particularly repugnant because they directly encourage violence,” but found the statements constitu-
tionally protected “because urging others to commit violent acts ‘at some indefinite future time’ does not 
satisfy the imminence requirement for incitement under the First Amendment.” Id. at 1115 n.9 (citing 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)). 
 165 Lidsky, supra note 151, at 148–49. This contributes to issues in enforcement of hate speech bans 
in other countries, which the Ninth Circuit had to face when asked to uphold a French court’s order, 
pursuant to the French Criminal Code, that required Yahoo! to remove French citizens’ access to Nazi 
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tify any immediate responses because it is challenging to identify a precise audi-
ence.166 This difficulty is due both to the size of a potential audience and the fact 
that a different audience may view the same post at different times, from differ-
ent perspectives, in different contexts, and in different parts of the world.167 
Thus, a post can directly cause incitement, but the imminence of that incitement 
is obscured by those dislocations.168 Regulation advocates, recognizing these 
shortcomings, urge courts to take action so that the doctrine can successfully 
combat harmful speech in such scenarios, emphasizing the need for flexibility in 
a doctrine meant to adapt to various scenarios and contexts.169 
2. Harm and Dignity Arguments 
Advocates argue that the harms stemming from both online and offline hate 
speech should warrant protection, despite the First Amendment implications of 
such protection.170 They point to the harmful physical, mental, and social im-
pacts that messages transmitted through the Internet have on targeted individuals 
and groups.171 Drawing on studies finding these harms associated with hate 
                                                                                                                           
propaganda presented on its website. See Timofeeva, supra note 25, at 275. Yahoo!, a California-based 
company, argued that this would violate the First Amendment. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Rac-
isme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1163 (2006). After 
three judges concluded that the suit was “unripe for decision” and three dissenting judges concluded that 
the district court did not have personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to 
dismiss the suit without prejudice. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d at 1224. See Timofeeva, supra 
note 25, at 275, for a discussion of this case. 
 166 Hammack, supra note 111, at 81. 
 167 Lidsky, supra note 151, at 148–49. 
 168 See id. (discussing the difficulties of applying incitement standard to online posts without sub-
verting doctrine’s goals). 
 169 See, e.g., Charlin, supra note 123, at 707 (“Given the speed and ease with which online threats 
can inflict harm, this long-disputed question of intent needs a quick resolution, as demonstrated by the 
number of cases involving true threats now percolating in the courts.”); Crocco, supra note 153, at 456 
(discussing the need for flexibility in this doctrine). 
 170 See Massey, supra note 128, at 155 (asserting that protection of individual interests against inva-
sion and preservation of “a more general societal interest in preventing violent rupture of social norms” 
justifies denying constitutional protection); Matsuda, supra note 139, at 2360 (“What is argued here . . . is 
that we accept certain principles as the shared historical legacy of the world community. Racial suprema-
cy is one of the ideas we have collectively and internationally considered and rejected . . . . We are not 
safe when these violent words are among us.”). 
 171 See Matsuda, supra note 139, at 2332 (“In addition to physical violence, there is the violence of 
the word. Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit the gut of those in the 
target group.”); id. at 2377 (“As Professor Delgado has noted, the underlying first amendment values of 
self-fulfillment, knowledge, participation, and stable community recognized by first amendment theorists 
are sacrificed when hate speech is protected.”) (citing Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort 
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982)); Tsesis, 
supra note 14, at 863–64 (“What is needed is a legal scheme to regulate the Internet because the messag-
es transmitted through that social space have physical, psychological, and cultural effects on real places 
and real people.”). See generally Delgado, supra (discussing psychological, physical, and societal harms 
caused by permitting hate speech). 
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speech, proponents of regulation insist that regulation can combat and reduce 
those harms.172 Moreover, regulation advocates argue that the harm perpetuated 
by hate speech extends further than that suffered by the targeted individuals; it 
extends to society more generally.173 
Advocates of hate speech regulations have identified two harms in particu-
lar: one direct and one indirect, both of which become clear in the context of 
hate speech on a white supremacist website.174 The direct harm of hate speech is 
that it contributes to humiliation and degradation suffered by targeted groups, 
particularly minorities.175 Advocates explain that racial insults, a common form 
of hate speech, are intentional affronts to personal dignity that lead to both im-
mediate emotional distress and long-term emotional pain that contributes to the 
psychological harm caused by stigmatization and disrespect suffered by those 
victims.176 Drawing on the findings of social scientists on the subject, advocates 
emphasize that degrading stereotypes can become “self-fulfilling prophecies” 
because racial insults are constantly directed towards these individuals.177 Such 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 171, at 146 (discussing social scientists’ studies on the effects of 
racism) (citing M. DEUTSCH ET AL., SOCIAL CLASS, RACE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 175 
(1968)); Matsuda, supra note 139, at 2361 (“Racism as an acquired set of behaviors can be dis-acquired, 
and law is the means by which the state typically provides incentives for changes in behavior.”); Tsesis, 
supra note 14, at 869 (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 57 (25th Anniversary 
ed. 1979)) (explaining Allport’s theory that, because discriminatory laws increase prejudice, laws prohib-
iting discrimination should increase tolerance and describing him as “one of the foremost experts on the 
psychology of bigotry”); see also Bennett, supra note 131, at 447 (“With a remarkable degree of uni-
formity, calls for hate speech regulation rest on supposed social harms or inequalities, and presume that 
severe and widespread speech-based harm is a frequent aspect of life with a constitutionally significant 
impact on minorities.”). 
 173 See Delgado, supra note 171, at 140 (“Racism and racial stigmatization harm not only the victim 
and the perpetrator of individual racist acts but also society as a whole. Racism is a breach of the ideal of 
egalitarianism, . . . an ideal that is a cornerstone of the American moral and legal system.”); N. Douglas 
Wells, Whose Community? Whose Rights?—Response to Professor Fiss, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 319, 319 
(1995) (“The harm caused by hate speech is greater than the psychological harm to the victims of hate 
speech; it also includes harm to society at large.”). 
 174 See David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 462 (1987) 
(“Two arguments for restricting racist speech are based on different visions of the types of harm it en-
genders: spread of racial prejudice, and affront to personal dignity.”); Romero, supra note 137, at 6, 8 
(discussing the direct harms and indirect harms recognized by advocates). 
 175 Delgado, supra note 171, at 146; Romero, supra note 137, at 6; see also ALLPORT, supra note 
172, at 142 (“One’s reputation, whether false or true, cannot be hammered . . . into one’s head without 
doing something to one’s character.”). 
 176 See Delgado, supra note 171, at 143, 145–46 (discussing dignitary, emotional, and other psycho-
logical harms associated with hate speech and emphasizing the malicious intent behind hate speech); 
Tsesis, supra note 14, at 842 (discussing dignitary harms); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburn-
ing and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787, 
796–97 (1992) (“The primary intent of the cross burner in R.A.V. was not to enter into a dialogue with the 
Jonses, or even with the larger community . . . . His purpose was to intimidate . . . . The discriminatory 
impact of this speech is of even more importance than the speaker’s intent.”). 
 177 See Delgado, supra note 171, at 146 (quoting M. DEUTSCH ET AL, supra note 172, at 175) (dis-
cussing prophetic nature of racial insults); accord Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 
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insults either implicitly or explicitly communicate those stereotypes.178 Psycho-
logical responses to this phenomenon, including self-hatred, humiliation, and 
isolation, lead those stigmatized individuals “to feel ambivalent about their self-
worth and identity.”179 Advocates urge society to recognize this dignitary harm, 
claiming that doing so would be more in line with societal recognition of other 
First Amendment principles.180 
The indirect harm recognized by advocates relates to the efficiency of such 
a website as a means of spreading white supremacist propaganda, which increas-
es the risk of hate speech translating into harmful acts.181 This argument is a nar-
rower formulation of a closely related argument commonly made by advocates 
of hate speech regulation—the argument that hate speech can lead to violence.182 
Advocates tend to rely on studies of social psychologists to support these types 
of harm theories.183 Of the social psychologists who have studied this link, Gor-
don W. Allport is widely recognized and commonly referenced by advocates for 
his work, having studied and identified five stages of the progression of racism: 
(1) antilocution (i.e., hateful or racist speech); (2) avoidance; (3) discrimination; 
(4) physical attack; and (5) extermination.184 Allport explains that activity on one 
level eases the transition to a more intense level.185 Accordingly, the mere exist-
                                                                                                                           
329 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (“Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subor-
dination.”). 
 178 Delgado, supra note 171, at 146. 
 179 Id. at 137. 
 180 See id. at 145 (arguing that recognizing these harms would be more in line with societal recogni-
tion of the harm in separate but equal educational institutions and in the potential offensiveness of requir-
ing one to display a state motto on their license plate); Lawrence, supra note 176, at 800 (explaining that 
promotion of self-expression and public discourse are two values protected by the First Amendment and 
implicated by hate speech); Matsuda, supra note 139, at 2377 (“As Professor Delgado has noted, the 
underlying first amendment values of self-fulfillment, knowledge, participation, and stable community 
recognized by first amendment theorists are sacrificed when hate speech is protected.”). 
 181 Romero, supra note 137, at 8. 
 182 See Kretzmer, supra note 174, at 463 (discussing the potential of hate speech to lead to violence); 
Massey, supra note 128, at 155 (arguing that speech can incite enough hatred to lead to violence, and that 
suppressing speech is justified when done to protect individuals’ private interests from invasion and 
protect society’s interests in preserving order and peace within a community). 
 183 Tsesis, supra note 14, at 869 (citing ALLPORT, supra note 172); see also Romero, supra note 
137, at 12 n.30 (discussing arguments of social psychologists). 
 184 See Kretzmer, supra note 174, at 463 (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 
285–339 (1954)) (discussing stages in progression of racism); Romero, supra note 137, at 12 n.30 (citing 
ALLPORT, supra note 172, at 142) (providing Allport as a reference for a “scholarly social science ap-
proach to understanding racial prejudice”); Tsesis, supra note 14, at 841 (citing ALLPORT, supra note 
172) (discussing potential progression of racist speech to violence). Antilocution describes “hostile talk, 
verbal denigration and insult, and racial jokes” directed towards a group. RICHARD GROSS & NANCY 
KINNISON, PSYCHOLOGY FOR NURSES AND HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 146 (2d ed. 2014). 
 185 Kretzmer, supra note 174, at 463 (citing ALLPORT, supra note 172). 
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ence of racist speech and hate speech generally makes the progression to the 
more violent stages easier.186 
Advocates emphasize that other unique features of Internet communica-
tions provide a new context for hate speech that allows for a risk of potential 
harm greater than that which psychologists contribute to hate speech in gen-
eral.187 Advocates highlight the fact that the Internet facilitates development of 
communities of like-minded people, making it easier for those who plan to 
commit violence to connect.188 This can also lead to normalization of violence 
within those communities, especially because counter-speech has proven less 
effective at combating online communications of hate speech.189 Advocates of-
ten point to other nations for support, emphasizing the United States’ position as 
an outlier and discussing the administrative issues that this position has caused 
for other nations attempting to combat online hate speech.190 According to advo-
cates, the global reach of online communications has led those who disseminate 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Id. Although Allport focuses on hate speech in general, scholars have relied on his findings in 
making arguments relating to this speech in an online context as well. See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 14, at 
869 (citing ALLPORT, supra note 172). 
 187 See Lidsky, supra note 151, at 149 (“[T]he actual or practical anonymity of many social media 
communications also fosters a sense of disinhibition in those contemplating violence, and the speed of 
communications allows incendiary speech to reach individual audience members at the point when they 
are most vulnerable to engaging in violent action.”); Hammack, supra note 111, at 81 (“Now that the 
Internet has become an integral part of our culture, its ability to reach widespread audiences, rapid ex-
change of information, low cost of use, veil of anonymity, and constantly changing audience make 
threats posted on the Internet seem more dangerous than the same threats made in an off-line context.”). 
 188 See Lidsky, supra note 151, at 149 (explaining the potential of social media to foster the for-
mation of “subcommunities of hate”); Hammack, supra note 111, at 82 (“Through email, discussion 
boards, and instant messaging, the Internet also facilitates the creation of networks of like-minded per-
sons to help carry out threats”). 
 189 See Lidsky, supra note 151, at 149 (discussing the potential for community-building aspects of 
social media to foster or normalize violence); Hammack, supra note 111, at 81 (discussing the inability 
for counter-speech to combat harmful speech on the Internet due to “the widespread and transient nature 
of the Internet’s audience,” which makes it “virtually impossible to locate a discreet audience to refute 
objectionable speech”). 
 190 See Matsuda, supra note 139, at 2346–48 (contrasting the United States’ position with other 
nations and emphasizing that it is in conflict with the international trend towards barring hate speech); 
Tsesis, supra note 14, at 863 (“These examples suggest that [the] United States[’s] pure speech jurispru-
dence is anomalous and that it is generally accepted, by democracies like Canada and Germany, that 
preserving human rights supersedes the right of bigots to spread their venomous messages.”); Webb, 
supra note 149, at 446–47 (describing the United States’ role as a “safe haven for the promotion of hate 
speech” and noting that the United States’ stance has undermined international efforts to combat hate 
speech). In response to arguments that divergence in positions on hate speech between the United States 
and other democracies may be justified by the unique history of those countries in combating discrimina-
tion and hate (e.g., Germany and its history with anti-Semitism), Alexander Tsesis presents a compelling 
argument: “[t]he history of racism in the United States, from Native American dislocation, to slavery, to 
Japanese internment, makes clear that here, as in other democracies, intolerance and persecution can exist 
in spite of the socially held ideal of equality.” Tsesis, supra note 14, at 863. 
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hate speech to create domains in the United States, thus circumventing the laws 
of their own states.191 
Even with the support of social psychologists and other nations, the diffi-
culty in accurately and effectively conducting a study to demonstrate the degree 
of the link between violence and hate speech has made this argument vulnerable 
to attack by critics.192 Critics attack the harm-based rationale, insisting that the 
harms contemplated by advocates are either not reliably measurable or are the 
subject of biased data or misconceptions in perception.193 Critics place much 
weight on the relatively attenuated and somewhat uncertain connection between 
hate speech and violence, which makes it a common point of attack.194 Advo-
cates counter these attacks by pointing to individual cases where hate speech and 
violence are clearly linked.195 They insist that, in light of the evidence that does 
exist in support of the connection between hate speech and social harms, the de-
gree of potential harm at stake should trump any uncertainty in the precise de-
gree of harm as the driving force for any decisions on whether to adopt regula-
tions.196 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See Webb, supra note 149, at 446–47 (arguing that, “by permitting hate speech to flow freely 
within its borders, the United States undermines other nations’ efforts to stop the promotion of hate 
speech”); All Things Considered: Comparing Hate Speech Laws in the U.S. and Abroad, NPR (Mar. 3, 
2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134239713/France-Isnt-The-Only-Country-To-Prohibit-Hate-
Speech [https://perma.cc/3R3W-B8J4] (discussing concerns expressed by the director of the Yale Initia-
tive for the Interdisciplinary Study of Anti-Semitism over the fact that hate groups have begun taking 
advantage of this by basing websites in the United States). 
 192 See Bennett, supra note 131, at 476 (attacking harm-based arguments based on a weak causal 
connection); Strossen, supra note 127, at 250, 259 (same). 
 193 See Bennett, supra note 131, at 499–500 (attacking the harm-based rationale for these reasons). 
In response to advocates who emphasize the psycho-emotional harms of hateful speech, John T. Bennett 
argues that using a psychological state as a metric of the impact of speech on psychological well-being is 
problematic due to an inability to precisely measure or gauge such a state on a scale. Id. at 486. 
 194 See, e.g., id. at 476 (attacking the harm-based argument based on uncertain and potentially-weak 
causal connection); Strossen, supra note 127, at 250, 259 (same). For example, Bennett insists that advo-
cating for regulation based on social inequalities perceived to be the product of racism involves an “em-
pirically unsound” line of reasoning. Bennett, supra note 131, at 476. He discusses various factors that 
might causally influence and contribute to social inequalities and explains that regulation would be mis-
guided, at least to the extent these social and economic harms are influenced and caused by factors inde-
pendent of hate speech. Id. Alternatively, Bennett posits that the harms are simply not severe enough to 
warrant regulation. Id. at 499–500. He suggests that, instead of promoting social justice, calls for regula-
tion “entrench the status quo, which uplifts no one and is actually debilitating.” Id. at 500. 
 195 See Kretzmer, supra note 174, at 465 (“[W]hile general studies showing the connection between 
racist speech and the spread of racial discrimination or racist violence are almost impossible to execute, 
there is no lack of individual cases in which the connection between speech and violence has been quite 
clear.”); Romero, supra note 137, at 9 (defending recognition of “a causal link between website hate 
speech and crimes committed by race mongers inspired by such propaganda” and providing Timothy 
McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, as an example of an individual with direct ties to an anti-
government, anti-minority movement). 
 196 See Massey, supra note 128, at 155 (explaining ability of hate speech to incite violence, directed 
either towards the speaker or the targets, and declaring this sufficient justification for suppression of that 
speech); Tsesis, supra note 14, at 869 (“It is the paradox of any legal reform that remedies for social evils 
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3. Advocates’ Proposed Solutions 
Proponents of regulation offer a variety of approaches for amending current 
doctrine so as to encompass harmful speech online.197 Many of these solutions 
involve changing the imminence standard so that hate speech can be properly 
evaluated under the incitement to imminent lawless action category of excepted 
speech.198 These include proposals to modify the imminent standard only for 
specific instances, such as establishing a separate threshold of imminence appro-
priate for application only to advocacy of terroristic acts on the Internet.199 Oth-
ers are broader, advocating for an imminence standard applicable to all Internet 
speech.200 For example, one commentator suggests modifying the standard for 
Internet speech by considering and balancing four factors in evaluating immi-
nence: (1) imminence as evaluated from the listener’s perspective, so as to cap-
ture the conduct that the incitement category of speech is meant to prevent; (2) 
the content of the speech, focusing on whether the speech, if spoken, would in-
cite harm; (3) the likely audience; and (4) the nature of the issue involved, con-
sidering the value of its contribution to current debate.201 Some have even sug-
gested taking away the imminence requirement completely and imposing civil 
liability for speech that otherwise meets the incitement test under the Branden-
burg standard, arguing that doing so does not hinder the ideals that the standard 
promotes.202 
Approaches also include proposals to modify the standards under other cat-
egories of excepted speech to allow these categories to capture threatening 
speech that would otherwise escape categorization based on technicalities.203 For 
                                                                                                                           
raise the possibility of new dilemmas. However, abstract uncertainties about potential evils should not 
constrain legislators from passing laws narrowly designed to curb expressions whose only object is to 
endanger . . . the less powerful.”). 
 197 See, e.g., Crocco, supra note 153, at 483 (separate imminence threshold for serious advocacy of 
terroristic acts); Hammack, supra note 111, at 67 (refining approach under true threat standard to capture 
hateful and threatening speech online). 
 198 See, e.g., Crocco, supra note 153, at 483 (separate imminence threshold for serious advocacy of 
terroristic acts); Cronan, supra note 161, at 455 (Internet-style modification for incitement standard). 
 199 See, e.g., Crocco, supra note 153, at 483 (suggesting establishing a “threshold of imminence” that 
can apply Internet terrorism to justify regulating such speech). 
 200 See, e.g., Cronan, supra note 161, at 455 (proposing an Internet-compatible modification to the 
incitement standard). 
 201 Id. at 455–57, 460. 
 202 See Tiffany Komasara, Planting the Seeds of Hatred: Why Imminence Should No Longer Be 
Required to Impose Liability on Internet Communications, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 835, 851, 853 (2002) 
(suggesting taking away the imminence requirement for incitement and imposing civil liability for speech 
on the Internet that otherwise meets the Brandenburg standard). The Brandenburg standard denies con-
stitutional protection to speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 203 See Hammack, supra note 111, at 67 (discussing the difficulty in applying true threat doctrine to 
online hate speech and arguing that courts should refine their approach to true threats to adapt to the 
changes brought about by the Internet). True threats are statements communicating an intent to commit 
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example, one commentator proposes modifying the intent standard under the 
true threat doctrine by considering the listener’s objective fear and the speaker’s 
subjective intent.204 This allows the doctrine to capture threatening speech that 
fails under the true threat standard because the speaker did not threaten to per-
form the act herself and that fails under the incitement category because the law-
less action is not technically “imminent.”205 
IV. EVALUATING TACTICAL, BUT NOT PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS 
Online speech is unlike the traditional forms of speech in that it encom-
passes features and dimensions that are incompatible with First Amendment ju-
risprudence, but compatible with the underlying doctrinal goals of preserving 
and protecting a cohesive, democratic society.206 Presented with this predica-
ment, critics of regulation present two arguments: one in which they attack the 
degree of certainty in which one can prove the link between hate speech in vio-
lence, and another in which they adopt an unwavering, absolutist position, insist-
ing on adhering to existing First Amendment doctrine without change or adjust-
ment and claiming that destruction of our liberal democracy is at stake.207 Not 
only is this a weak argument, but it also fails to recognize the realities of today’s 
society.208 
Section A of this Part analyzes and evaluates the tactics used by critics to 
detract and distract from the incompatibility of online speech and historic First 
                                                                                                                           
some violent, unlawful act on a specified group or individual, which are evaluated without regard to a 
speaker’s actual, subjective intent. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
 204 Hammack, supra note 111, at 67. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See Funk, supra note 132, at 580 (arguing that First Amendment doctrine does not contemplate, 
and thus does not directly address, the type of threatening and inciting speech communicated on the In-
ternet); Lidsky, supra note 151, at 161 (discussing the problem with applying Brandenburg standard to 
social media and highlighting differences between audiences and speakers contemplated by Brandenburg 
test and those who use social media to express views); Hammack, supra note 111, at 66–67 (explaining 
that First Amendment jurisprudence relating to potentially threatening speech arose in the context of 
communications made in “fundamentally different media,” where cases typically involved “remarks 
relayed to a very limited audience through pamphlets or at small rallies” and thus required a simpler 
analysis). 
 207 See STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 155–56 (insisting that hate speech laws are ineffective in com-
bating harms, might suppress protected speech, and “would gravely damage core principles that secure 
freedom of speech, equality, and democracy”); Bennett, supra note 131, at 478, 500 (arguing that the 
degree that speech fosters social inequalities is unclear and that a variety of causes, unrelated to racism, 
could be responsible); Crocco, supra note 153, at 457 (“Proponents of the Internet tend to be free expres-
sion absolutists and, not unlike other purists, fiercely guard the right to free speech under any circum-
stances.”). 
 208 See Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government Regulation to Preserve 
the Internet’s Unregulated Character, 85 MINN. L. REV. 215, 216 (2000) (“First impulses about the 
Internet often turn out [] wrong because the Internet is so profoundly different from previous objects of 
regulation. And so it seems with the . . . many who have called for government to take a hands-off ap-
proach to the Internet, particularly in the area of speech regulation . . . .”). 
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Amendment jurisprudence during attempts to argue against doctrinal change.209 
Section B argues that, in light of these transparent tactics and the weak argu-
ments in favor of continued protection of hate speech, the United States must 
amend First Amendment doctrine to properly contemplate, consider, and protect 
against the realities of and interactions among cyberspace, socio-psychological 
influences of human behavior, and hate speech.210 
A. A Classic Tactic: Distract, Accuse, and Distract Again 
First Amendment absolutists who oppose restricting hate speech in ways 
that would disrupt or alter current First Amendment principles respond to advo-
cates with three tactics: distraction, attack, and appeals to tradition and stagnan-
cy.211 Notably, none of these responses defend hate speech, in and of itself, as 
worthy of protection.212 Instead, critics distract with a “parade-of-horribles”-type 
argument, in which they exclaim that restricting any speech will inevitably lead 
to erosion of the entire First Amendment doctrine and its protection.213 The fal-
lacy of this tactic becomes transparent when one looks at the judicially created 
origin and development of those categories of speech that are excluded from 
First Amendment doctrine.214 The wavering of First Amendment protection for 
inciting speech during wartimes demonstrates this, as the level of protection 
granted to speech was contingent upon societal and political conditions, mani-
festing itself in the form of reduced protection for dissident speech during times 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See infra notes 211–227 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 228–262 and accompanying text. 
 211 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 131, at 521 (distracting with a “parade-of-horribles” argument by 
arguing that “hate speech regulation would empower lawmakers to barter away the right to free speech”); 
id. at 471 (attacking the harm-based rationale for restricting hate speech based on the assertion that social 
scientists have been associated with a liberal-leaning, institutional bias and alleging that it would be 
“constitutionally unsound to accept biased social science as a basis for restricting speech”); id. at 489, 
491 (appealing to tradition by suggesting that the severity of racism inflicting American society does not 
warrant changing First Amendment doctrine to suppress hate speech and premising this on the fact that 
minorities have made significant progress towards true equality since the Civil Rights era). 
 212 See Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 3, at 161 (acknowledging the higher costs and harms associated 
with hate speech on the Internet but defending the United States’ protection of such speech based on the 
Constitution); Chemerinsky, supra note 139 (discussing harm of hate speech but advocating for free 
speech over regulation). 
 213 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 127, at 250 (“Allowing speech to be curtailed on the speculative 
basis that it might indirectly lead to some possible harm sometime in the future would inevitably unravel 
free speech protection.”). 
 214 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332 (1920) (explaining that freedom of speech is not 
absolute but, rather, is subject to restrictions and limitations decided by the Court and explaining distinc-
tions developed for such limitations in prior cases) (first citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 
(1919); then citing Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 206 (1919)). 
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of war.215 Failure to recognize that First Amendment protection has proven to be 
anything but absolute makes these arguments untenable.216 
Critics of regulating hate speech attack any perceived weakness in the 
harm-based arguments that proponents champion.217 Critics attack the purported 
link between violence and hate speech, calling it too attenuated or simply too 
dynamic in the factors contributing to it.218 Most critics do not present any evi-
dence to the contrary; they simply deny that the harms are definite enough or 
severe enough to warrant speech restrictions.219 They distract from any links 
between hate speech and real-world violence that have been identified by ignor-
ing examples of violent behavior spurred by hate speech online, honing in on the 
uncertainty inevitable in all scientific studies, and using the complex realities of 
human behavior and cyberspace to cast doubt on and distract from the evidence 
that does support a causal connection between Internet hate speech and violent 
acts.220 Even the select few who do offer more legitimate support for their argu-
                                                                                                                           
 215 Hudson, supra note 66, § 3:3; see also Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 338 (justifying curtailing of rights 
during times of war). 
 216 See Crocco, supra note 153, at 457 (“Proponents of the Internet tend to be free expression abso-
lutists and, not unlike other purists, fiercely guard the right to free speech under any circumstances.”); cf. 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925) (applying previous, less protective standard for incite-
ment speech and emphasizing that the fact that a state may prohibit “utterances inimical to the public 
welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to ques-
tion”) (first citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); then citing Patterson v. Colorado, 
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); then citing Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915)); see also Warren v. 
United States, 183 F. 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1910) (explaining that the competency of Congress to restrain the 
rights of liberty and freedom of speech “in the interest of the general welfare, peace, and good order” is 
“beyond question,” and as such, related legislation is consistently upheld by courts). 
 217 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 131, at 500 (basing his attack on speech-based harms on difficulties 
in reliably measuring social harm and an allegation that there is no reason to believe speech-based harm 
is as severe as advocates insist). In response to advocates who emphasize the psycho-emotional harms of 
hateful speech, Bennett argues that using a psychological state to gauge the impact of speech on psycho-
logical well-being is problematic due to an inability to precisely measure such a state on a scale. Id. at 
487. 
 218 See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 155–56 (insisting that hate speech laws are ineffective in 
combating harms, might suppress protected speech, and “would gravely damage core principles that 
secure freedom of speech, equality, and democracy”); Bennett, supra note 131, at 478, 500 (arguing that 
the degree that speech fosters social inequalities is unclear and that a variety of causes, unrelated to rac-
ism, could be responsible); see also Bennett, supra note 131, at 491 (defending against harms of hate 
speech by arguing that “[e]xpressions of overt racism in modern America have undeniably decreased 
following the Civil Rights era”). 
 219 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 131, at 500 (“In summary, there is no reason to believe that Ameri-
can minorities are facing harms of racism and discrimination to the degree posited by Matsuda, Delgado, 
and other speech regulation advocates. The core premises of hate speech regulation could be errone-
ous.”); accord id. at 489 (stating that “[r]acism may at times be misperceived” in support of his argument 
that psychological and emotional harm should not be relied upon to gauge harm caused by speech). But 
see STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 151–52 (discussing psychological studies suggesting that shielding 
individuals from stress-inducing speech may reduce mental health). 
 220 See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 151–52 (emphasizing the benefits of short-term stress on 
mental health and crediting hate speech as a source of such benefits); Bennett, supra note 131, at 478 
(basing his arguments on the premise that societal harms flowing from racism and hate speech are not as 
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ments appear to resort to such tactics, whether intentional or not, as a veil for the 
weak support for their positions.221 One prominent scholar, for example, relies 
on the findings of two international, observation and experience-based studies 
for her rejection of the merits of the causal connection between hate speech and 
harm.222 While these studies do offer legitimate support, they were conducted in 
the early 1990s and resulted in no definitive conclusions regarding such connec-
tion, apart from the inability to identify one.223 It is difficult to imagine that such 
studies would conclude similarly if conducted after the advent of social me-
dia.224 
Finally, critics distract again by pointing to countries with hate speech laws 
that have been abused and suggest that hate speech regulations are susceptible to 
abuse in the United States.225 Interestingly enough, unlike they did in their anal-
                                                                                                                           
bad as academic researchers suggest and arguing that the potential number of causes that contribute to 
societal harms favors resisting regulation). For example, Bennett discusses the position of hate speech 
regulation advocate Professor Delgado, who analyzed social psychology research studies that indicate the 
harmful impact of racist speech on minorities. Id. at 488. Rather than presenting contradictory evidence, 
Bennett rejects the study as outdated and argues that, because the study was conducted in 1968, it should 
not be relied upon as support for the harms of racist speech in modern times. See id. (“Delgado’s citation 
for that claim was a study published in 1968. Surely the impact of racism in America has changed some-
what during the intervening years . . . . Those committed to the tradition of free speech may want answers 
to these questions before consenting to surrendering their First Amendment rights.”). 
 221 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 127, at 258–59 (relying upon findings of studies conducted prior to 
the rise of the Internet). 
 222 See id. (discussing studies). 
 223 See id. (discussing studies). 
 224 See id. (discussing studies from 1991 and 1992); see also STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 136–37 
(relying on Human Rights Watch studies to argue against hate speech restrictions). See generally COM-
MON SENSE MEDIA, Percentage of Teenagers in the United States Who Have Encountered Hate Speech 
on Social Media Platforms as of April 2018, by Type, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/
945392/teenagers-who-encounter-hate-speech-online-social-media-usa/ [https://perma.cc/93WB-AKQF] 
(2018 survey of 1,141 U.S. teenagers, ages thirteen to seventeen, showing that fifty-two percent reported 
having encountered hate speech on social media often or sometimes); Felix Richter, The Rise of Social 
Networking in the United States, STATISTA (2013), https://www.statista.com/chart/913/the-rise-of-social-
networking-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/VEH3-KG95] (detailing rise of social media network-
ing in the United States from 2005 to 2013); Patrick Wagner, By 2021 More Than 1/3 of the Globe Will 
Be on Social Media, STATISTA (2018), https://www.statista.com/chart/15355/social-media-users/ [https://
perma.cc/YY5X-KWED] (providing statistics on global social media use, spanning from 2010 to 2017, 
and predicting outcome for the years 2018 to 2021 based on upward trend). Acknowledging the potential 
impact of social media, Strossen points to another Human Rights Watch study conducted in 2016, which 
focused on hate speech regulations in India and reached similar results. See STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 
83 (“A quarter-century later, Human Rights Watch reached a similar conclusion in its report on the en-
forcement of ‘hate speech’ laws in India.”). The narrow scope of this report, focused only on one country, 
makes this contention unpersuasive. See id. (justifying reliance on older Human Rights Watch study with 
results in 2016 study of hate speech in India). 
 225 See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 81 (“Given the pervasiveness of individual and institu-
tional bias, the government is likely to enforce ‘hate speech’ laws, as it has other laws, to the disad-
vantage of disempowered and marginalized groups. Indeed, laws censoring ‘hate speech’ have predicta-
bly been enforced against those who lack political power . . . .”); Strossen, supra note 127, at 258 (dis-
cussing selective enforcement of laws banning hate speech in South Africa). 
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ysis of the potential harms of hate speech, critics place little emphasis on the 
abundance of other causal factors that might contribute to this abuse, such as the 
political, social, or economic climates in those countries.226 In contrast, propo-
nents of hate speech regulation list countries with similar democratic institutions 
and values in place, such as Germany and Canada, which have successfully 
promulgated those regulations without destroying the fabric of their liberal de-
mocracies, thus revealing the transparency of these tactics.227 
B. A Rational Rethinking for the Real World 
Much of the scholarship surrounding the First Amendment’s protection of 
hate speech on the Internet emerged prior to the advent of social media.228 Con-
sideration of the impact of social media that social psychologists have more re-
cently studied, however, not only lends support to the arguments advanced by 
proponents of restricting hate speech, but also further demonstrates the weak-
nesses of the arguments advanced by critics of regulation.229 For example, a 
common argument against regulation appeals to the power of counter-speech, 
suggesting that a plausible solution to the problem of hate speech is to fight it 
with counter-speech, which avoids violating existing First Amendment princi-
ples.230 This argument, however, presumes an effectiveness of counter-speech 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 127, at 258–59 (citing STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREE 
SPEECH, AND NON-DISCRIMINATION, supra note 127) (discussing failure of hate speech laws in other 
countries and omitting discussion of other factors that may distinguish the viability of such laws in the 
United States). 
 227 See Matsuda, supra note 139, at 2346–47 (“[T]he existing domestic law of several nations—
including states that accept the western notion of freedom of expression—has outlawed certain forms of 
racist speech.”); Timofeeva, supra note 25, at 254 (contrasting the United States’ approach with that of 
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United States, however, rests in the minority, and it remains the only country to expressly protect it.”). 
 228 See Romero, supra note 207, at 3 (discussing inability for First Amendment jurisprudence to 
combat the spread of white supremacist websites and making no reference to social media); Weintraub-
Reiter, supra note 3, at 157–58 (discussing modes of communication and information retrieval offered by 
the Internet but omitting social media from list). 
 229 Compare STROSSEN, supra note 134, at 182 (defending counter-speech as a remedy for hate 
speech), and Franklyn Haiman, The Remedy Is More Speech, AM. PROSPECT (1991), https://prospect.
org/article/remedy-more-speech [https://perma.cc/GE4B-DKSU] (same), with Thai, supra note 56, at 310 
(suggesting the inadequacy of counter-speech as a remedy to combat harmful speech and basing this on 
the inability “to reach the highly polarized echo chambers of social media”), and Hammack, supra note 
111, at 81 (discussing the inability for counter-speech to combat harmful speech on the Internet due to 
the nature of audience, making it “virtually impossible to locate a discreet audience to refute objectiona-
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combating hate speech). 
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that the echo chambers effect impedes by filtering out what would be counter-
speech and exposing a user solely to content supportive of his or her own 
views.231 Social media algorithms designed to personalize user content feeds 
contribute to further this effect, allowing for amplification of the polarizing im-
pact of confirmation bias and the creation of echo chambers.232 These processes 
all interact to contribute to polarization on both an individual and societal level 
and, most importantly, increase the potential of hate speech to translate into ac-
tual violence.233 Filtering out a countervailing view distorts the prevalence of the 
remaining view as perceived by both the speaker and listener of hate speech.234 
To victims of hate speech, this amplifies the impact of the hate speech in terms 
of subordination and denigration felt.235 To the speakers, the absence of counter-
speech encourages feelings of validation in their views and actions, which can 
lead to adoption of more radical stances or even violence.236 Thus, although not 
“imminent” enough to amount to create a clear and present danger under the 
formal Brandenburg test, the severity, directness, and ability of this harm to in-
cite becomes increasingly clear.237 
Re-evaluating domestic terror attacks and past incidents of violence, in 
light of what is known about this phenomenon, demonstrates the reality behind 
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2019] Free, Hateful, and Posted: Rethinking First Amendment Protection 2141 
the manifestation of hate speech into real-life violence.238 In 2015, for instance, 
Dylann Roof murdered nine individuals at a historical black church in South 
Carolina; his online rantings suggest this phenomenon’s involvement.239 On his 
website, Roof complained that “[w]e have no skinheads, no real KKK, no one 
doing anything but talking on the internet.”240 This indicates that Roof noticed a 
distortion between the amount of individuals he “talk[ed] on the internet” with 
and the amount of action being taken in the real world, and it is very possible 
that this distortion contributed to his determination to act and his validation of 
those acts.241 Although this is only one example, many domestic terrorists have 
similarly engaged in online hate speech.242 As social media becomes an increas-
ingly significant part of our society’s daily interactions, the potential for this 
phenomenon to repeat itself is limitless and daunting.243 
In fact, concerns about an increase in incidents of domestic terrorist attacks 
and increases in the amount of hate speech online have recently emerged, closely 
tracking the rise of social media.244 Rather than brushing off these concerns as 
too speculative or demanding more definitive research studies, those who advo-
cate against hate speech regulations should consider what is happening in the 
real world.245 Knowledge about the impacts of social media on human behavior 
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and psychology may be limited, but what is known is significant.246 Moreover, 
with hate speech on the rise and social media continuing to develop and make 
way for novel modes of communication, the potential for future harm is at its 
peak.247 Rejecting that harm as speculative, or denying the existence of any tan-
gible, direct harms beyond the psychological injuries to hate speech victims, is 
not only mistaken but also deeply problematic.248 This is even more so where, as 
is the case here, those who reject that harm as insufficient enough to warrant de-
nial of First Amendment protection present arguments that do not hold weight.249 
As social media networks grow in prominence and global usage, failure to 
address the shortcomings of American constitutional doctrine will only become 
more problematic, polarizing, and detrimental to society.250 As a nation, we must 
accept the failings of our current doctrine and embrace the fact that Internet speech 
is vastly different than the forms of speech contemplated during ratification of the 
Constitution and throughout much of First Amendment doctrinal development.251 
Rethinking the imminence standard under the incitement to imminent lawless ac-
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tion category of speech provides a good, if not necessary, starting place.252 While 
the requirement of imminence traditionally provides a safeguard against frivolous 
over-censorship of speech based on consequences that are too far-removed, cyber-
space challenges previous notions of time and space and contemplates less trans-
parent behavioral responses.253 Hiding behind a computer screen, speakers of po-
tentially harmful speech can now incite violence or spread hatred from another 
part of the world and do not have reason to fear physical harm or any other conse-
quence of physical presence stemming from incitement of a crowd or individu-
al.254 With this possibility for remote and shielded incitement, and the widespread 
availability and efficiency of social media for disseminating speech, the costs of 
participating in and propelling hate speech have lowered.255 The severity of the 
associated harms, however, have risen.256 
The rising prevalence of online hate speech merits more than simply tweak-
ing current doctrine as a compromise with tradition.257 It is important to remember 
the judicially created origin of these categories and, within these categories, the 
fluctuation of the standards required to censor such speech during times of peace 
and times of war.258 The current First Amendment jurisprudence is a result of judi-
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cial policymaking in response to societal needs.259 Regulating online hate speech 
would simply be a continuation of this traditional response.260 As an outlier in its 
stance on hate speech, the United States has the unique opportunity to look to other 
nations’ hate speech regulations, their implementation, and their impact in real-
time.261 Failure to take advantage of this would be sophomoric and indefensible.262 
CONCLUSION 
Because hate speech does not squarely fall within any of the categories ex-
cluded from First Amendment protection, the United States is an outlier in that, 
unlike most nations, it protects this hate speech. The inability of existing First 
Amendment doctrine to combat hate speech has led to criticism and calls for re-
form by those who believe the societal harms of hate speech warrant amending 
existing doctrine in favor of banning this speech. These calls garner support from 
social psychologists studying the psychological impacts of social media on behav-
ior and psychologists who have studied the psychology behind hate speech, as 
these studies indicate that the harms that online hate speech present extend far be-
yond dignitary harms to victims, reaching society as a whole by promoting vio-
lence and disorder. Faced with this overwhelming reality, those who advocate 
against banning hate speech respond with tactics designed to distract from the real-
ity behind these contentions, presenting a “parade-of-horribles” argument and at-
tacking any perceived weakness in arguments posed by the other side. Revealing 
the fallacies behind these tactics demonstrates the need to amend First Amendment 
doctrine so that it can properly combat, control, and contemplate the power of hate 
speech transmitted through social media communications. Doing so requires more 
than a forced doctrinal amendment, and would be consistent with the judicial poli-
cy-based development of present First Amendment doctrine. With so many other 
nations leading the way to soften the risk, it is time for the United States to follow. 
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